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Abstract 
What configuration of strategies and discourses enable the white male and settler body politic 
to render itself as simultaneously wounded and invulnerable? I contextualize this question by 
reading the discursive continuities between Euro-America’s War on Terror post-9/11 and 
Algeria’s War for Independence. By interrogating political-philosophical responses to 
September 11, 2001 beside American rhetoric of a wounded nation, I argue that white 
nationalism, as a mode of settler colonialism, appropriates the discourses of political 
wounding to imagine and legitimize a narrative of white hurt and white victimhood; in effect, 
reproducing and hardening the borders of the nation-state. Additionally, by turning to Fanon 
and Mbembe, I argue that settler colonialism produces what I term as “scenes of captivity,” 
where the settler nation-state detains, incarcerates, and interrogates brown, Indigenous, and 
black bodies both for producing knowledge about those bodies and protecting and 
securitizing the nation-state. Understanding the ways in which settler colonialism’s logics of 
detention, captivity, and interrogation, both then and now, provides insights into how we 
might begin dismantling detention centres. 
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1  Introduction:  
And yet, when I see Mbappe running as fast as Husain Bolt, when I 
see Pogba or Umtiti or Varane scoring a decisive goal, or Ngolo 
Kante or Matuidi hustling the opponent as if they were endowed with 
two lungs, I am not cheering French nationalism, the nationalism that 
has caused so much suffering in Africa and is still causing so much 
suffering among French citizens of African descent in the "banlieues" 
of the North._____________________________________________ 
-Achille Mbembe, “France and its ‘NEGRO SUBSIDY’”  
1.1 The Night of the Absolute  
The recent controversial dialogue between Trevor Noah and the French ambassador for the 
United States, Gerard Araud, finds its residue beyond the context of the Coup de monde. 
Responding to the French victory against Croatia in the 2018 FIFA World Cup, The Daily 
Show host had said in jest that it was, instead, an African victory, not a French victory. 
Disturbed with Noah’s suggestion, Araud issued a lengthy response to Noah, accusing him of 
repeating the very same logic and rhetoric of exclusion deployed by white supremacists and 
nationalists. For Araud, the victory belongs to France if only because the players that 
comprise the team can only be French. They were educated in France. They were raised in 
France. They were properly assimilated into Frenchness—a victory that can be claimed by 
the centuries-old civilizing mission.1 Therefore, despite the routes that brought them to 
France and despite the roots that extend beyond France, the players can only claim a French 
identity. “To us, there is no hyphenated identity, roots are an individual reality,” writes 
Araud. “By calling them an African team, it seems you are denying them their Frenchness.” 
Yet, even if Araud’s sentiments originate from a place of benevolence, that is to say, that 
French identity is ultimately “inclusive,” it is only through the exclusionary logic of erasing 
                                                 
1 Araud concludes his letter to Noah by referring to the tenants of French civilization: fraternity and equality. 
The letter in full can be found here: https://france-amerique.com/en/world-cup-ambassador-araud-answers-
trevor-noah/  
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roots and routes that one can find inclusion into so-called Frenchness. In other words, one is 
only French, as Araud seems to suggest, if one plays the role of French identity—as if 
identity is a mask to wear. Truthfully, on whose behalf is Araud permitted to speak?  
 To be sure, this dialogue between Noah and Araud, which sparked quite the 
controversy across social media and mainstream news outlets, is neither new nor 
revolutionary. Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre had a very similar exchange of intellect 
amidst the wave of decolonization across Africa and the Caribbean. Rather problematically, 
Sartre attempted to think through and against the category of race, positing that blackness is a 
phase in a Hegelian dialectic, a phase waiting to be overturned where the universal category 
of the human awaits its discovery. As Sartre writes, “thus [Africanness] is the root of its own 
destruction, it is a transition and not a conclusion, a means and not an ultimate end.”2 Much 
like Sartre, Araud seeks the next step in the grand dialectical narrative: the abolition of race, 
routes, and roots for the security of French identity.  
 Fanon did not let Sartre off the hook for his dialectical positing of Africanness or 
Negritude as the antithesis to Frenchness and its whiteness. For Fanon, Négritude was not 
necessarily “a minor term” in a Hegelian schema.3 It was a movement for one to lose their 
consciousness “in the night of the absolute.”4 As Fanon shrewdly points out, Sartre had 
forgotten the necessity of losing oneself in the “essences of determinations of its being”; as 
such, Fanon read Sartre’s description of the dialectic as always already robbing Fanon of his 
experience of blackness. More importantly, Sartre’s dialectic robbed Fanon of the potential to 
write his own history, narrative, and being. Fanon writes, “And so it is not I who makes a 
meaning for myself, but it is the meaning that was already there, pre-existing, waiting for me. 
It is not […] that I will shape a torch with which to burn down the world, but it is the torch 
that was already there, waiting for that turn of history.”5 It was for Fanon, in short, that he 
was predestined to be white within this historical and racial schema.  
 Noah’s critique of Araud’s response finds resonance with Fanon in addition to 
serving as a critique of Sartre’s dialectic. There is no room for hyphenated identities, it 
seems, in Sartre’s historical narrative. Frenchness and blackness are opposite poles of a 
                                                 
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, qtd. in Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks. (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 102.  
3 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks. (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 103-104. 
4 Ibid., 106.  
5 Ibid., 102. 
 ix 
 
dialectical equation that foresees the eventual erasure of both or, in Araud’s case, the 
absorption of blackness into the eventual absolute that is French identity. Noah rejects these 
claims, posing the question of why is it that both “identities” cannot be lived 
simultaneously.6 Indeed, Araud misreads Noah’s criticism, understanding Noah as positing 
that one either rejects their Frenchness or their Africanness. Instead, the opposite is true: one 
can live both. In other words, Noah rejects the dialectical hypothesis entirely. This 
conclusion from Noah comes from a recognition of the deeply embedded hypocrisy of 
Araud’s words. Even if Araud means what he says whole-heartedly, his words cannot escape 
the colonial reality as well as history that influence the movement of populations, the 
epistemic violence behind France’s civilizing mission, and the xenophobic rhetoric that 
remains in everyday Euro-American politics. Noah poignantly says: 
Here’s what vexes me the most […] when I read stories [about] Africa and 
when I hear what politicians say—especially in France about African 
migrants—when they are unemployed, when they may commit a crime, or 
when they are considered unsavoury, it’s the African immigrants. When their 
children go on to provide a World Cup victory for France, we should only 
refer to them as French.  
 I think that the dialogue now and the dialogue then point to a broad issue: that of the 
preservation and protection of whiteness as Frenchness or as Americaness. Even as shrewd 
as Noah’s critique becomes, it also fails to reflect on the settler colonial replication of 
national identities such as “French” or “American” within the dialogue itself and the ways in 
which the dialogue secures these “identities,” geographies, and borders as natural fact. 
Within the question Noah poses of why can one not be both French and African or African 
and American, another question lurks: can one be neither? I raise this question as a way to 
draw attention to the problem in which this dialogue reinforces and naturalizes the formation 
of settler nation states and their borders. Further, while Araud celebrates the “diversity” of 
France, this comment emerges within a global paradigm of hardening borders, securing 
                                                 
6 Trevor Noah, “The French ambassador to the U.S. @GerardAraud criticized Trevor for congratulating Africa 
on France’s World Cup victory. Trevor responds #BetweenTheScenes:,” @TheDailyShow, (July 18, 2018). 
https://twitter.com/TheDailyShow/status/1019751037853241344. All proceeding quotations and paraphrasing 
of Noah are sourced from his video posted by The Daily Show twitter handle.  
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borders, and closing borders entirely across the Euro-American frontiers post-9/11. In other 
words, while Araud finds suspicion in Noah’s controversial joke, lamenting that it 
“legitimizes the ideology” that claims France can only be white, France in addition to the 
majority of Euro-America have committed to the process of securing or hardening nation-
state borders. In the end, Araud reifies and strengthens French borders as something 
unchanging, impermissible, and as constituting a social body that distinguishes itself as an Us 
opposed to Them.  
 Indeed, while France now heralds a rather liberal leader—who seems to have 
thwarted a toxic, radical right wave within the French government—President Emmanuel 
Macron fails to uphold the humanistic and liberal ideologies that Araud uses to found his 
critique of Noah. In brief, Macron’s agenda when it comes to the politics of immigration has 
been set on toughening French borders as he tries to attend to the divide between the left and 
the right.7 Furthermore, the notorious and opaque white supremacist, Steve Bannon, has 
continued to stir the pot with regards to the radical right agendas, fanning the flames of 
France’s own anti-immigration party in addition to proposing a far-right election think tank 
for Europe. His goal, of course, is the hardening of borders and the reformation of discrete 
national identities. As Bannon recounts in an interview with the Daily Beast, “Right-wing 
populist nationalism is what will happen. That's what will govern […]. You're going to have 
individual nation states with their own identities, their own borders.”8 Indeed, Bannon is 
deploying the same strategy and politics he used while acting as advisor for President Trump, 
who instituted a ban on immigration from Muslim countries and has committed an exorbitant 
amount of American resources towards constructing a border wall against Mexico, under the 
pretense of strengthening, protecting, preserving, and hardening the national body of the 
United States of America.  
1.2 Fragile Nations, Fragile White Bodies 
The desire for hard national bodies contra fragile nations can be found in both current events 
and their historical parallels. This thesis, then, situates itself within an ongoing exchange, 
both historical and discursive, between French and American modes of empire and settler 
                                                 
7 Aljazeera, “France’s National Assembly approves tough immigration reform,” Aljazeera, (April 21, 2018).  
8 Steve Bannon qtd. in Aljazeera, “Steve Bannon Planning Foundation Boost Europe,” Aljazeera, (July 21, 
2018): par 3. 
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colonialism. I attend to these exchanges by presenting a thesis composed of two parts, which 
are linked by an affinity for a War on Terror that is shared between America and France. On 
the one hand, post-9/11 Euro-American military intervention into Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Syria, for example, marks current events. On the other hand, France’s drawn out war to 
suppress Algerian independence from 1954-1962 marks a historical parallel where discourses 
of terror delegitimized Algerian nationalism. These so-called Wars on Terror conceal(ed) the 
insidious projects of racism, xenophobia, settler colonialism, and Arab death that have been 
naturalized as the necessary collateral damage to preserve the body of the nation along with 
the usual civilizing-democratic mission.  
 I began thinking through the problem of the hard body or hard nation when I 
confronted its twin, albeit also its opposite, within the Euro-American philosophical 
responses to September 11, 2001. This twin of hardness, which most often persists on the 
edge of these responses, and yet has been critically investigated by broader postcolonial and 
critical race scholarship, is hurt, injury, or vulnerability. Whenever a Euro-American nation 
refers to the necessity of fortitude or whenever a settler state addresses the need for the nation 
to heal, it is making a claim about its perceived injuries (whether present, present-past, or 
future possibilities). Indeed, the philosophical responses that I speak of—such as Slavoj 
Zizek’s Welcome to the Desert of the Real, Jean Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism, and 
Giovanna Borradori’s collection of interviews in Philosophy in a Time of Terror—rightfully 
describe the cultural and socio-economic discovery of “vulnerability,” “injurability,” and 
“hurt” by Euro-America in the wake of September 11, 2001. However, these philosophical 
responses offer little to no attention on how this constellation of fragility within their 
respective works allows for a deeper commentary on white male subjectivity. That is to say 
that whiteness, and its manifestation into settler nation-states such as America, has quite 
problematically capitalized on its own perceived vulnerability for the suppression of 
exogenous others, the justification of military occupation of the Middle East, and the 
maintenance of the claim that whiteness, as demographic or race, is confronting its own 
genocide after 9/11.  
 Again, these sentiments are nothing new, which is why I attend to the exchange 
between America and the settler colonialism of France. Indeed, amidst the independence of 
Algeria from France, the French Algerian colonizers foresaw only two choices: either face 
extinction by staying in Algeria or “return” to the metropole. As well, up until and during 
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Algeria’s war for independence, the French Republic frequently utilized the discourse of the 
“terrorist Muslim threat” to sanction not only a war against the Front de libération nationale 
(FLN) but to round up and massacre, torture, and humiliate thousands of Muslim bodies. As 
such, by exchange I mean that a citational practice brings these two seemingly discrete 
events into conversation. Indeed, Algeria’s war for independence and this contemporary War 
on Terror are separated by a recognizable temporal and geographical difference. 
Nevertheless, the last decade and a half has witnessed a renewed interest in Algeria’s war for 
independence under the contextualization of America’s military engagement in the Middle 
East. Prefaces, introductions, as well as reviews of a growing library of memoirs, 
biographies, and critical literature on Algeria stress the relevance of Algeria to today’s War 
on Terror.9 Quite often, this body of literature poses the question: what can we learn about 
terrorism by studying France’s engagement with the FLN and other rebel groups over the 
course of its (illegitimate) occupation of Algeria? How can we further understand the 
pathology of the terrorist, Arab body? While I do follow this exchange throughout the course 
of my thesis (particularly in part three), I reject this grotesque mode of questioning that has 
emerged within the context of the invasion of the Middle East by Euro-America. Instead, I 
unveil a different problem and set of questions that underlies our current political moment 
and the settler colonialism of French Algeria. This thesis interrogates the ways in which 
predominantly white male bodies come to surface within the context of September 11, 2001 
and the broader settler colonial narrative. Furthermore, the thesis interrogates the ways in 
which these white bodies imagine themselves as the legitimate victims of historical 
processes.  
 The primary question, then, that this thesis pursues is what configuration of 
strategies, technologies, and discourses enable the white, settler body politic to render itself 
as simultaneously injurable, wounded, or hurt and hard, secure, and invulnerable? I explore 
this question in two chapters that think through this problem from two different theoretical 
perspectives. On the one hand, I attend to this problem by reading how the politics of 
wounds, which was originally elaborated by postcolonial, Indigenous, and critical black 
feminist theoretical perspectives, has been appropriated by whiteness as a way to claim an 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Alistair Horne’s 2006 edition of A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962. The front 
cover remarks that “anyone interested in Iraq should read this book immediately.” 
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injured identity. This problem becomes quite apparent in recent events across Euro-America 
such as Charlottesville where crowds of white male bodies assemble in public spaces and 
universities to claim they are oppressed by the winds of left-wing radicalism. As such, I 
perform critical comparative reading of the discourse that emerged out of Charlottesville 
alongside the political-philosophical responses to 9/11 by Euro-American philosophers as 
well as President Bush. I find that these seemingly disparate discourses, that is, these 
discourses that could be readily plotted as right wing and left wing, utilize very similar 
language to understand not only 9/11 but to imagine the American body politic as, ultimately, 
a wounded body.  
 However, I am careful to distinguish the politics of wounds that emerges in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001 from the important and radical work of Indigenous and 
critical black scholars, writers, and activists. They are not identical. Throughout Chapter One 
and in the Conclusion, I attend to the work of these thinkers and how their politics of wounds 
not only refuse contemporary political-social structures but actively works toward and invest 
in anterior futures. In juxtaposition, I find that the futures that an injured whiteness imagines 
are bleak, apocalyptic, and eternally invested in reproducing the same.  
 On the other hand, Chapter Two turns to the controversial war for independence that 
took place in French Algeria between 1954-1962. It is here where I think through the 
biopolitics of knowledge production within the settler colony, tracing similarities into present 
contexts. More to the point, I find that the detention, torture, and interrogation—which is also 
a widespread contemporary phenomenon—produces a form of knowledge called an 
ethnoepisteme. This ethnoepisteme demarcates which bodies are vulnerable and which are 
invulnerable. In the case of French Algeria, in addition to America’s Abu Ghraib, 
Guantanamo Bay, and refugee detention centres in abandoned Wal-Marts, the brown, black, 
and Indigenous body is produced as always already woundable in juxtaposition to a white 
body impervious to harm. Once again, I confront this simultaneity of whiteness’ perceived 
injurability and invulnerability insofar as the French settler colonial regime detained and 
tortured Muslim terrorist “suspects” in an attempt to thwart further settler colonial injury (in 
the form of FLN bombings within the settlers’ quarter predominantly in the city of Algiers). 
Yet the gratuitous display of violence on the part of the French colonialists reveals the 
unequal distribution of vulnerability that defines not only the settler colonial context of 
French Algeria but the continued settler colonial occupation of Turtle Island. I also find, 
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however, that this is a violence that the settler colonial regime, both then and now, tirelessly 
works to conceal from view such as in the case of the Abu Ghraib archive which has been 
sealed behind the bureaucratic walls of the United States military.   
 I do not centre the white male body within this thesis. The organization of my 
research—in addition to thinking about my own positionality, as a white male body, in 
relation to both the critical theoretical work from Indigenous and Black scholarship and 
whiteness as it is taken up in the following pages—does not work to centre whiteness, even if 
at times the white male body becomes the object of knowledge under interrogation. Surely, 
as a white male body, I do not intend to “redeem” whiteness or found a whiteness that is 
compossible with social justice. Such a method works to centre whiteness or to preserve 
whiteness. I critically analyze white embodiment within the politics of wounds so that I can 
decentre and debunk its claims of injury, hurt, and genocide. I believe that this is the work, 
that is, the work of decentring whiteness, that every white male settler scholar must do. It is 
where my research begins. While I may take up the white male body as an object of analysis, 
I do so from the critical theoretical perspective of Indigenous and black scholarship. As such, 
I cite predominantly Indigenous, black, and feminist thinkers who centre indigeneity and 
blackness, allowing the possibility of life, for futures, and of knowledges that are otherwise. 
That is not to say, however, that I am centring blackness or indigeneity. I do not have that 
capacity, nor do I desire that capacity. I can only, I believe, decentre whiteness and that is the 
work that I will take up.   
 Ultimately, the two chapters are linked together by their work to decentre the politics 
of wounds that are claimed by settler coloniality and whiteness. While Chapter One concerns 
itself with the centring of the politics of wounds within a post-9/11 America, Chapter Two 
decentres this politics by attending to the material and psychoexistential wounds of 
Indigenous and black bodies, which are engendered by settler colonial and biopolitical logics 
of control, captivity, and domination. Both chapters find a similar conclusion: the logical 
extreme of settler colonialism is the detention or interrogation centre where Indigenous and 
black bodies are wounded, hurt, and made vulnerable for the preservation of whiteness and 
its coloniality. Yet, it is by the material creation of these centres of detention that whiteness 
strategically centres itself. In other words, by decentring from view the horrors that have 
emerged from settler colonialism—and by extension the War on Terror—whiteness can 
centre itself as the wounded subject thereby justifying its exploitive use of detention centres. 
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 I see these problems of knowledge, the (white) body politic, and racialization 
identified here as deeply connected to the dubious debates surrounding Trevor Noah’s 
response to France’s “victory” of the World Cup. Not only do Araud and a variety of media 
outlets work to conceal the long-running legacy of settler colonialism that has upturned and 
exploited populations, they construct Euro-American identity and borders as something in 
need of “protecting” or “purifying.” While these supposedly liberal positions find themselves 
in opposition to the work of Bannon, Trump, and the myriad of white supremacist groups 
that continue to find a political platform across public spaces and university campuses, they 
in fact share a similar concern for the protection of the nation as if it is always already 
vulnerable to its exterior.  
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2  Chapter One - “The Intimate Memory of Wounds”: 
Charlottesville, Whiteness, and Wounded Bodies 
in the Time of Terror10 
Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its 
violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading 
contradictions: the intimate memory of wounds, defeats, and 
humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of 
aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at 
times of unspeakable violence.____________________________   
 -Anne McClintock, “Paranoid Empire: Spectres of 
Guantánamo…” 
2.1 Introduction:  
How do wounds enter politics? It was not until the tragic and shocking events that took 
place in Charlottesville in the summer of 2017 that I realized that this is the question that 
organized my research. This question is incredibly timely because white nationalism 
rallies around a wounded identity, and as such it finds too many allies and too many 
sympathizers, as if the horrors of the twentieth and twenty-first century Euro-America—
colonialism, white supremacy, and genocide—did not already have enough advocates.11 
With this in mind, then, I want to specify the question even further: what role do wounds 
play in the formation of white nationalism and white identity (which I sometimes include 
under the singular banner of whiteness)? To frame the question in a different light: how 
has whiteness come to see itself as wounded? In this chapter, I argue that whiteness, 
particularly in this contemporary moment after 9/11, hinges on a wounded and vulnerable 
                                                 
10 Anne McClintock, “Paranoid Empire: From Guantánamo to Abu Ghraib,” Small Axe 28 (2009): 54.  
11 Euro-America in the past the past year has seen no shortage of white supremacist marches and related 
ideology, from the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville of early August of 2017 to the burning of a Nazi 
swastika in Georgia in April 2018 and finally to Dr. Ricardo Duchesne touring a book called Canada in 
Decay: Mass Immigration, Diversity, and Ethnocide of Euro-Canadians (2017). As it will become apparent 
in the course of this chapter, they all share the twisted belief in a reality of white genocide.  
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identity that shapes not only the embodiment of whiteness but also whiteness’ relation to 
temporality. Indeed, whiteness has come to believe that it is under attack, and that a 
hostile world threatens it with genocide and future hurt. I think through these questions 
and this argument through what I denote as the politics of wounds. 
 Over the course of my research for this chapter, I have come to identify a 
constellation of terms: vulnerability, injury, hurt, and wound. For the purposes of this 
chapter, these terms often stand in for one another, that is, one gestures towards the other. 
To be sure, these terms find resonance in critical race, Indigenous, and black feminist 
scholarship—which the making of this thesis is indebted to—but they also find political 
use in national discourses and rhetoric, a use which I believe has been unexplored up 
until now. As such, what wound, injury, and hurt come to represent has been appropriated 
from “minority politics” by a myriad of versions of white nationalism. At times, then, this 
chapter is somewhat comparative in its trajectory—thinking through wounds in both 
subaltern or minority politics and whiteness. Of course, the politics of wounds deployed 
by the two are far from identical. Whereas minority politics grounds its politics of 
wounds within a material and tangible history as well as the present, whiteness, like a 
hypochondriac, imagines the historicity and materiality of its wounds. Nevertheless, this 
citational complex of imagined wounds on the part of whiteness provides credence to a 
milieu of phobias towards racialized others (Islamophobia and negrophobia) in addition 
to anxieties towards an uncertain future.  
 I privilege wound as a category of analysis, however, because it offers something 
that vulnerability, injury, and hurt do not necessarily connote. Hence, I do not speak in 
terms of “the politics of vulnerability” or otherwise, which might be closer to Butler’s 
later projects or Wendy Brown’s contributions to the political-philosophical project that I 
am grappling with. As the title of this chapter suggests, a phrase borrowed from Anne 
McClintock’s shrewd critique of American empire, ‘wound’ as a category of analysis 
leaves room to think through memory, temporality, and history. These concepts are 
significantly important to settler colonial forms of white nationalism. In other words, 
memory and history are always at stake for white nationalists. Indeed, the Unite the Right 
rally in Charlottesville assembled over the possible removal of a statue of a Confederate 
soldier, Robert E. Lee. Of course, also, the event of 9/11 has been called a wound on 
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America time and time again, and the World Trade Centre has been called a monument to 
the triumph of global capitalism. After the fall of the Twin Towers, what has been 
denoted as Ground Zero has come to memorialize not only the towers but also the 
possibility of future hurt—or maybe even future annihilation. In short, wound as a 
political category allows the flexibility of thinking through the intersection of material 
bodies, national monuments, and history as woundable subjects.  
 I proceed predominantly with discourse analysis and a close reading of what 
might first appear as an odd assemblage of works. Although I am fascinated with white 
nationalism in its more opaque forms, such as the Unite the Right Rally in 
Charlottesville, I am also keen on identifying how whiteness functions in Euro-American 
political-philosophical knowledge production. The sources I have chosen to examine, 
then, include important works by Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida, and Jean Baudrillard, 
considering they have offered invaluable insights into vulnerability, wounds, and future 
hurt. I read these texts alongside President Bush, President Trump and the outspoken 
voices of the Alt-Right because they all use the same language of wounds and all make 
very similar assertions, participating in the unfettered proliferation of whiteness whether 
cognizant of this participation or not. Namely, the over-determination of September 11th, 
2001 as a wound on America, an expression of future hurt, and the blurring of how, in 
fact, vulnerability and injury is unequally distributed along racialized and gendered lines 
in the War on Terror. In other words, the white male body is narcissistically centred as 
the body in need of protection.  
 As such, this chapter encompasses three parts. In part one, I think through how 
wounds inform white nationalism and white identity. I will show that “wound” is a 
keyword in constructing national identity and a sense of national unification. Part two 
interrogates how wound, injury, and vulnerability after 9/11 were important philosophical 
concepts for Euro-American philosophical-political knowledge production to understand 
history, temporality, and ethics after 9/11. I also wish to identify, however, that this 
shared project of knowledge production works to conceal the visibility of injured white 
(male) bodies. This thesis thinks through a contradiction in whiteness insofar as 
whiteness builds an identity as both vulnerable but also invulnerable. Finally, part three, 
which serves as a conclusion, tackles the question of temporality insofar as the politics of 
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wounds imagines a paranoid temporality of possible future hurt. I close this chapter, then, 
by thinking through the embodiment of whiteness in relation to future hurt, that is, it is 
always preparing itself for future hurt.  
2.2 Wounded Attachments: National Discourses and 
Identities of Injury  
“A wound inflicted upon one member of our community is a wound inflicted upon us 
all,” President Trump read from his script, in a rare, sober moment to an audience of a 
few thousand in Phoenix, Arizona, during his summer 2017 tour of the United States.12 
Amidst the controversy of wishy-washy statements regarding the Unite the Right Rally in 
Charlottesville (read: white supremacist march), Trump attempted to save face by 
evoking a sense of a unified, American community—albeit a wounded community—in 
his discourse on the march. Moments later, Trump reiterated that “when one part of 
America hurts, we all hurt.” As always, though, Trump did not fail to contradict himself 
by reminding his audience that America is ultimately an “unbreakable team.” By 
“unbreakable,” I find that Trump is suggesting to his audience that the American body 
politic is strong, powerful, and invulnerable. 
 Benedict Anderson notes that the imagined community that makes up the nation is 
a historically situated phenomenon, emerging with both emotional fervor and the 
confluence of diverse political-ideological leanings.13 It is in this historical instance that 
is commonly characterized as a “time of terror” that I investigate the simultaneous 
resurrection of white nationalism and imagined as wounded communities, which I think 
converges through Trump’s speech quoted above. How is it that a community or a nation 
comes to see itself as “wounded”? In what ways is wounded America taken up in Euro-
American political-philosophical projects?  
 The Euro-American nation, I argue, imagines the delimitations of vulnerability—
                                                 
12 For a complete transcript of Trump’s address, see Time Magazine’s “President Trump Ranted for 77 
Minutes in Phoenix: Here’s What He Said,” August 23rd, 2017 (March 29th, 2018). It is fascinating to 
ponder how Trump’s speeches will be compiled and archived alongside those of previous presidents, 
considering his many inarticulate moments in which he veers off script or stares dumbly into the cameras of 
the media.  
13 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
(London: Verso, 2006), 4.  
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that is, how a nation comes to see the vulnerability of itself and of communities inside 
and outside itself. Further, these terms are always shifting at the whim of critical political 
moments and contexts. Anderson offers a particularly potent starting point in thinking 
through the aforementioned questions: “communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”14 Indeed, as I will 
show, America as a nation is imagined in the style of ressentiment towards a hostile 
world that promises nothing but future hurt. I situate a portion of this chapter, then, 
within the conflict between the right and the left that took place in Charlottesville, 
Virginia. This Unite the Right Rally, I suggest, mobilized through a shared sense of 
political wounding: white genocide and white displacement, finding its rhetorical rigor in 
post-9/11 style paranoia and fear. But I also think through Charlottesville alongside the 
philosophical-political responses to September 11, 2001, as well as the intoxicating 
affects of fear and paranoia that ferment white nationalism in this post-9/11 era. 
 I do not entirely wish to separate these categories—identity and nationalism—nor 
conflate them. Inseparable and irreducible, these congruous categories rather seem to 
share a certain level of immanence in the other, a reverent love for each other. To be sure, 
nationalism, and to an extent whiteness, does not find its exuberance without patriotic 
love. As Anderson writes, “it is useful to remind ourselves that nations inspire love.”15 
Indeed, while these movements might mobilize on a shared imaginary wound created by 
alien threats or insidious Marxist and postmodern ideology, they ultimately cloak 
themselves with a passion for their country, their heritage, and their memory. Why else 
would hundreds of right-wingers flock to Charlottesville like migrating birds to protect 
what they believe to be one of the last remnants of a Great America? Of course, 
whiteness does not stand in for the Euro-American nation and vice versa, but they 
nevertheless inform and inflect each other’s respective projects, and find their 
reproductive technologies in the other.16 During the night of August 1, 2017, white 
                                                 
14 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.  
15 Ibid., 16. 
16 Nandita Sharma. “White Nationalism, Illegality and Imperialism: Border Controls and Ideology,” in 
(En)gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflage Politics, ed. Kim Rygiel and Krista Hunt 
(London: Routledge, 2016), 123. See also the introduction to The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2015) by 
Sara Ahmed.   
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nationalists marched through the streets of Charlottesville with torches in hand, chanting, 
“We will not be replaced. Jews will not replace us.” Under the premise of “uniting the 
right,” this assembly was composed of white nationalists, neo-Nazis, and bored white 
college students. With the removal of a statue of Robert E. Lee from Emancipation Park 
to occur on August 12, white nationalists found the most opportune moment to rally with 
the intention to protect American memory against the encroaching left’s alleged crusade 
on wholesome American values and heritage. This Unite the Right Rally did not appear 
in a vacuum, however, and surely not without opposition. The left mobilized in response, 
and after two days of confrontation, thirty people were injured and a counter-protestor, 
Heather Hayes, was run over by a member of the Unite the Right who thought it prudent 
to drive into a crowd of counter protestors. Indeed, his comrades offered the alibi that he 
was just trying to protect himself from angry leftists. Regardless, the eyes of the left were 
on President Trump to denounce the rally for what it was—white nationalism dreaming 
of a new ethno-state and worshipping the catch-phrase “Make America Great Again.” 
Instead of denouncing the rally, Trump doubled down, announcing that the rally was 
composed of some “very fine people.” While a great deal of criticism against Trump 
rightfully acknowledges his roundabout way of supporting the rally, I am keen on 
thinking through his sense of nationalism that emerged in response to Charlottesville. 
Indeed, Trump was silent for days after the murder of Heather Hayes, and Trump could 
not help but subtly praise the rally for its political views. However, he utilized this 
politically charged moment in an attempt to “unite” America. One of the things I show in 
this chapter is how politics of wounds, which might just find vitalization in September 
11, 2001, underpins the political agenda of Trump and Charlottesville: unification, 
ressentiment, and xenophobia. 
 To be sure, this politics that I name as a “politics of wounds” is not isolatable to 
Charlottesville nor Trump’s own twisted sense of nationalism. And certainly, it is not 
exclusive to the right. It finds, I suggest, particular resonance in this so-called time of 
terror that memorializes what might be thought of as the exceptional wound on the nation 
that is September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center, 
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President Bush offered his own rendering of the national wound through his dialogues to 
the American people. “I will never forget this wound to this country,”17 Bush mourned. 
In the same speech, Bush further lamented the damage unleashed on one of America’s 
other national symbols, the Pentagon. Bush said, “The wound to this building will not be 
forgotten. But it will be repaired. Brick by brick, we will quickly rebuild the Pentagon.”18 
However, America is not alone in its nationalisation of a wound.  
 In Canada, the constellation of discourses concerned with Truth and 
Reconciliation have imagined the nation as “wounded” by its residential school history. 
Maintaining a temporal distance from its coloniality through the partitioning of 
colonialism to its supposedly far-away history, Canadian politicians and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission reminded Canadians and Indigenous persons that 
reconciliation means healing the national wound that is the residential school system, 
which unfortunately burdens the memory of all citizens. As the final report by the 
Commission explains, “A just reconciliation requires […] talking about the need to heal 
the deep wounds of history”.19 Of course, this appropriation of Indigenous pain and 
wounds for national progress—that is, moving past its history into a truly postcolonial 
national identity—comes at the expense of Indigenous communities.20 Nevertheless, the 
Commission’s report, which is supposedly liberal and progressive in its foundation, 
chillingly echoes Trump’s already frigid response to the Unite the Right in Phoenix: “I 
say we have to heal our wounds and the wounds of this country.” In short, national 
progress is often tied up with sentiments of national healing.  
 France, capitalizing on its own terrorist spectacle with the Paris killings of 
November 13, 2015, also reinvigorated its nationalism through the expression of a 
wounded French identity. In a special seminar, Alain Badiou reminded his audience that 
                                                 
17 President George W. Bush, Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush (Washington: U.S 
Government, 2011), 73. 
18 Bush, Selected Speeches, 71.  
19 Honouring the Truth, Reconciling the Future: Summary of the final report of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada. (Ottawa: Canadian Government, 2015), 263.  
20 See David Garneau’s contribution to Arts of Engagement, “Imaginary Spaces of Conciliation and 
Reconciliation: Art, Curation, and Healing,” for a wonderful explication on the ways in which 
Indigenouspain is exploited by a myriad of institutions and political bodies for the benefit of Canadian 
“progress.”  
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“[these] French wounds are not so recent.”21 Responding to what he calls the “identarian 
drive,” Badiou interrogates the rash responses by commentators linking the attacks and 
ensuing trauma to national identity. In other words, French identity is constructed around 
and through the spectacle of the attack. To be French, in this both emotionally and 
politically charged moment, meant to be wounded. “With the tri-color flag in hand, […] a 
horrific massacre on French territory can only reinforce national sentiment,” Badiou said. 
“As if trauma automatically referred us back to identity.”22 This identarian drive that 
Badiou identifies in the responses to the attack is starkly reminiscent of post-9/11 U.S. 
where the language of “wounds” frequently enters both political and philosophical 
discourses to imagine a cohesive, American identity. However, the politics of wounds 
does not find an origin in national discourses alone: injury, wounds, and vulnerability has 
been theorized and debated within critical race, Indigenous, and feminist scholarship.  
2.2.1 The Political Sphere of Wounds 
In the Cultural Politics of Emotion, Sara Ahmed suggests that “our response should not 
simply be to critique the rhetorical use of injury or wounds, but to attend to the different 
ways in which ‘wounds’ enter politics.”23 As such, I must delineate between how the 
“wound” enters white nationalist projects and how it enters other political projects such 
as Indigenous resurgence and black feminist theory, which sometimes operate on a 
politics of redress through legal and economical claims. Indeed, quite a breadth of 
scholarship in critical race and feminist theory attends to the politics of wounds as it 
enters the discourses of marginalized groups and subaltern voices, aiding in the 
construction of cohesive identities. Notably, feminist scholar Wendy Brown makes the 
argument that identity formation in marginalized communities tends to fetishize a 
wounded subjectivity by virtue of being excluded from the benefits of neoliberal 
capitalism. For Brown, this strategy reinforces the structures that excluded them in the 
first place, ultimately undermining their criticisms of the structure itself. As such Brown 
                                                 
21 Alain Badiou, Our Wound Is Not So Recent: Thinking the Paris Killings of 13 November. (London: 
Polity, 2016), 1.  
22 Badiou, Our Wound Is Not So Recent, 3.  
23 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotions. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 32.  
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poses a shrewd question: “what kind of political recognition can identity-based claims 
seek—and what kind can they be counted on to want—that will not resubordinate a 
subject […]?”24 I raise Brown’s question here because wounds share an affiliation with 
the politics of recognition that have been addressed by various critics, as I will show 
below. 
 Recent Indigenous scholarship has critically addressed the political stakes of 
recognition, particularly within the context of the settler colonial state. Rather than 
offering new political avenues for recognition within the colonial state, many Indigenous 
thinkers have argued for a politics of refusal to avoid the appropriation of wounds by the 
colonial state in these acts of recognition, which often leads to the further 
disenfranchisement of Indigenous communities and disavowment of Indigenous wounds 
that do not readily fit into national narratives of healing and progress. For example, as 
Glen Coulthard points out, in an attempt to repair an injurious legacy, the colonial state 
frames Indigenous claims to ongoing wounds or pain as reactionary politics that impedes 
the colonial state’s “healing process.” As Coulthard rightfully and bitterly contends, 
“what gets implicitly represented by the state as a form of Indigenous ressentiment—
namely, Indigenous people’s seemingly pathological inability to get over harms inflicted 
in the past—is actually a manifestation of our righteous resentment: that is, our bitter 
indignation and persistent anger at being treated unjustly.”25 Coulthard avoids the pitfall 
of political recognition that resubordinates the subject, by positioning Indigenous 
resentment as refusing the settler state’s recognition of Indigenous wounds within a 
narrow purview. 
 In her seminal work, Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman expertly charts how 
the scene of the wounded flesh of the slave, as an event of recognition, fails to liberate 
the slave from this fleshly subjection. Instead, these scenes merely conflate “injury with 
                                                 
24 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 55.  
25 Glen Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the colonial politics of recognition. (Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 2014), 126. See also Audra Simpson’s Mohawk Interruptus and Leanne 
Simpson’s As We Have Always Done for an important contribution to what a politics of refusal looks like in 
both active scholarship and ethnography as well as embodied practice.  
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personhood.”26 Of course, this has engendered all too convenient “bare life” and 
“victimization” tropes in critical scholarship that all too often inhibit the possibility of 
active refusals and creative futures, which have become central to black feminist 
thought.27 While I intend to pick up these threads in the proceeding chapters, in this 
chapter I am interested in further thinking through how pain, wounds, and suffering 
enter—or perhaps more accurately have been appropriated—into “the political struggles” 
of white nationalist movements, particularly in the realm of identity/group formation.  
 I suggest, then, that Euro-American (white) nationalism co-opts the language of 
wounds, vulnerability, and injury, familiar to minority politics, to frame the (white) 
nation as exceptionally wounded or exceptionally vulnerable. In his analysis of France’s 
political and moral defeat with the loss of its colony, Algeria, in 1964, Achille Mbembe 
asserts that “to be acknowledged politically, struggles for recognition must be constructed 
around an exceptional signifier—my suffering and my wounds.”28 The exceptional 
signifier of suffering and wounds in contemporary American discourse without a doubt is 
September 11, 2001. My intention here is not to downplay the tragedy that is 9/11 nor to 
create a hierarchy of tragedy within the politics of wounds. I am merely investigating the 
exceptionalisation of 9/11 as a national wound and how the wound in discourse is moored 
to 9/11, and how it enters into the political project of whiteness. After all, the fall of the 
Twin Towers has commonly been documented as a wounding of neo-liberalism, late 
stage capitalism, and imperialism—all of which are political and economic categories 
that find their roots, if not gratuitousness, in white supremacy. As such, September 11, 
2001 becomes the exceptional event that describes historical and material wounding 
insofar as it interrupts America’s narrative of its own continuity of exceptionality. This 
exceptionality poses serious political and material ramifications that have led to both the 
acceleration of and concealing of the “unequal distribution of death, suffering, and pain,” 
which have become hallmarks of late liberalism. In other words, the very 
“exceptionalisation” of 9/11 as wound renders all other wounds in the realm of political 
                                                 
26 Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Centaury 
America. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 6.  
27 Alexander G. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist 
Thought. (Cambridge: Duke University Press, 2014), 1-2. 
28 Achille Mbembe, “Provincializing France,” Public Culture 23, no. 1 (2011): 114.   
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discourse mute. Hence, I am struck by Elizabeth Povinelli’s radical question in light of 
this event that apparently jumpstarted an inert history: “How do specific arrangements of 
tense, eventfulness, and ethical substance make affectively and cognitively sensible and 
practical, late liberal [unequal] distributions of life and death, hope and harm […]?”29 In 
other words, while, for example, Indigenous communities and black communities 
materially suffer under the violent economical tectonics of late liberalism, whiteness 
rallies around its wounded ego post-9/11 as if it is the only legitimate political concern 
facing the 21st century. As such, as I will show later in this chapter, there is an interesting 
discursive link between the rhetoric of terror and the Unite the Right Rally’s foundational 
claims of white genocide, white displacement, and white injury. 
 However, whiteness and its relation to injury has been economically and legally 
constituted in Euro-American jurisprudence. This is particularly pertinent in the context 
of the United States and Canada—settler-colonial nation-states which have remained 
committed since the creation of their geographical boundaries to classifying the races of 
the world through law and science in an attempt to protect the economic interests of 
whiteness. American legal scholar Cheryl Harris traces how whiteness became 
“property” in the legal discourses of American law in the advent of the sciences and 
liberalism.30 Pivotal to the formation of whiteness as identity, Harris claims, is whiteness 
as property—that is, whiteness is something that can be possessed, held, and transferred 
between legal persons. In effect, a person who has the privilege of identifying as white 
could claim injury against their whiteness as if it were property in the event a law, a 
transaction, or insubordination by racialized others would incur negative economic 
outcomes to their livelihood. Unsurprisingly, this “whiteness as property” juridical 
structure prolonged racial segregation, economic as well as social anti-immigration 
policies, and mass incarceration of racialized bodies which continues today in late 
liberal’s unequal distribution of vulnerability.31 
 How does a collective identity form around a shared sense of injury in the context 
                                                 
29 Elizabeth Povinelli, Economies of Abandonment, 5. 
30 Social critic Ta-Nehisi Coates has pointed out that whiteness is indeed an heirloom, inherited through the 
generations. See his article “The First White President” (2017) published in The Atlantic for a shrewd 
analysis of Trump’s (not-so) bizarre ascendancy to Presidency.  
31 Cheryl Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” Harvard Law Review 106, no. 8 (1993): 1244-56.  
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of whiteness (as identity and as nationalism)? Prior to the outbreak of white nationalists 
into the streets of Charlottesville, these nationalists were spreading their inflammatory 
remarks on a host of social media sites. Notably on Twitter, these nationalists claimed 
that “there is a war against you, white men and white women, on the streets of our cities.” 
In basic xenophobic fashion, they asserted that “foreigners are continuing to float across 
the border to ensure that this trend of white displacement and genocide continues.”32 
Perhaps whiteness sees itself in a losing struggle for recognition in the neoliberal order of 
things—where the Hegelian script of master and slave is reversed, and whiteness seeks to 
restore the balance.  
 These anxieties and fears towards diminishing access to resources, now and in the 
future, are not limited to blatant white nationalists. Indeed, many journalists and thinkers 
have attempted to explain away the rise of Trump (and white nationalism) as reactionary 
politics towards a defunct American Dream for white families as American factory cities 
seem to turn into empty economic shells. As Linda Alcoff argues, a spectre in the form of 
a demographic and economic shift “haunts” Euro-America as the “white population” is 
projected to recede into “minority status” by 2050. Alcoff writes, “a specter [haunts] the 
United States as well as Europe, producing a white reaction that can take pretty hysterical 
forms, although it is often carefully cloaked to avoid the charge of racism.”33 In other 
words, whiteness perceives a much larger hurt within the memory-making of 9/11 and 
other historical artefacts such as the Robert E. Lee statues, which engenders the lived fear 
of being replaced, displaced, and erased along with their monuments and symbols of 
superiority.  
 David Roediger offers another perspective on this logic in his analysis of the 
white worker. Roediger argues that whiteness has gone hand in hand with the white 
worker’s sense of identity. As such, “whiteness was a way in which white workers 
responded to a fear of dependency on wage labour and to the necessities of capitalist 
                                                 
32 New York Times, “The Fight for the White Race: What some of the Charlottesville Participants Stand 
For,” The New York Times, last modified August 19th, 2017.   
33 Linda Alcoff, The Future of Whiteness. (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), 4.  
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work discipline.”34 Not only did white workers utilize this whiteness (as property) to 
distance themselves from racialized workers who were also exploited by the American 
Dream, it allowed them to think of themselves as always better off. By virtue of 
possessing whiteness, the white worker believed they had a bountiful economic future. 
Yet, as the average worker increasingly identifies as a person of colour, and as labour is 
displaced by neoliberal policies, the white worker’s fears and anxieties towards the 
system that he or she depends on ignites into ressentiment and fierce white lash.35 Hence, 
white nationalists’ and President Trump’s call for uniting the right or uniting the nation 
against economic displacement, demographic shifts, and, as I will show, future terrorist 
attacks.  
 Whiteness unifies as a formidable group identity—ripe for the picking by Trump 
to install a white nationalism in his discourse—under the assertion that this group is 
wronged by an openly hostile world, a world plagued by terrorists and unfair deals. In 
other words, whiteness as identity infuses its energy from what Wendy Brown calls 
ressentiment. Borrowing from Nietzsche, Brown describes ressentiment as a realm of 
minority politics where their “injury,” by way of exclusion from the “white middle-class 
ideal,” becomes the foundation of their group identity. 36 For Brown, this ressentiment 
produces a kind of politics that “presents itself as a self-affirmation [but is] predicated on 
and requiring sustained rejection by a ‘hostile world.’”37 Although whiteness in the 
context of Euro-America does not fit the criteria of minority politics, I do think that the 
current mobilization of whiteness and white identity appropriates minority modes of 
politics to render their claims as something recognizable and legitimate.38 Indeed, on the 
                                                 
34
 David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class. 
(London: Verso, 2007), 13 
35 American commentator and author, Van Jones, introduced the term “white lash” into the discourse on 
President Trump’s election, which baffled political commentators across the spectrum. Jones remarked on 
Trump’s election during a CNN interview: “This was a white-lash. This was a white-lash against a 
changing country, it was a white-lash against a black president, in part, and that’s the part where the pain 
comes.” 
36 Brown, States of Injury, 55.  
37 Ibid., 75.  
38 In the short and viral documentary produced by Vice Media, Race and Terror (2017), which followed 
white nationalists on the ground during their Charlottesville march, one media jockey, Christopher 
Cantwell, boasted that the right is borrowing every mobilization trick from the leftist playbook to be 
“finally” seen and heard.  
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surface, the white claim to barred access to the middle-class ideal does not appear radical. 
But these claims quickly mutate into anti-immigration and racist “solutions,” which have 
devastating material consequences.   
2.2.2 The Visibility of Wounds 
Up until now, I have predominantly been thinking through how “wounds” enter the 
politics of white nationalism and white identity. Despite claims to a wounded identity, 
however, how whiteness takes up space is quite different. How do we come “to see” 
(injured) white (male) bodies? Indeed, the discourses of injury, wounds, and vulnerability 
popularly deployed by whiteness does not discursively produce vulnerable, injured, or 
wounded white bodies in space.39 Rather, whiteness embodies as hard, armoured, or 
invulnerable, which I seek to explore further in the next two sections.  
 I identify this stark difference between embodiment and discourse as a 
contradistinction that not only emerges within the political mobilization of white 
nationalists in Charlottesville or the rhetoric of Donald Trump, but that this 
contradistinction also permeates political-philosophical projects that have attempted to 
grapple with the event that is 9/11 and the War on Terror more generally. Much like how 
the “wound” enters politics, 9/11 qua wound has been a talking point of philosophy in 
this alleged time of terror. I take this as a point of analysis because this philosophical-
political knowledge production reproduces and naturalizes whiteness in the way it 
theorizes the event that is 9/11. As feminist scholar Sunera Thobani frequently brings to 
our attention throughout her work, Euro-American knowledge production often 
haphazardly reproduces systems of dominance, violence, and imperialism even when 
these projects seek to contest these systems.40 As such, I explore Judith Butler’s Frames 
of War, Jacques Derrida’s response to Giovanna Borradori in Philosophy in a Time of 
Terror, and Jean Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism. These are thinkers who have 
contributed critical work on the War on Terror and terrorism after September 11, 2001. 
                                                 
39 At a first glance, this might appear contradictory to the matter of bodies that Judith Butler describes in 
Bodies That Matter (1993). That is to say, the idea that “discourse produces what it names.”  
40 Sunera Thobani, “The Secularity of Empire, the Violence of Critique: Muslims, Race, and Sexuality in 
the Politics of Knowledge-Production,” Hypatia 23, no. 3 (2017): 717. 
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Nevertheless, my intent here is to demonstrate how these thinkers—although they offer 
useful insights into philosophy and politics that emerged with the event named 9/11—
both invisibilise whiteness and legitimate its claim to a wounded identity. Particularly, 
Baudrillard and Derrida render absent the materiality of wounded white (male) bodies as 
they fetishize the symbolic and structural wounding of 9/11. Beginning with Butler, I 
hope to return the body as the primary object of analysis in these dialogues insofar as the 
body is the site or sight of the wound. However, Butler, in her ontology of vulnerability, 
neglects how vulnerability is not only racialized but unequally distributed among bodies. 
Only certain bodies, in other words, have material access to hardness. Yet, I wish also to 
show how these thinkers overdetermine the historical and symbolic significance of the 
fall of the Twin Towers, contributing to the exceptionalisation of this so-called wound.  
2.3 Wounds Without Bodies: The Symbolic Imagery of 
9/11 in Political-Philosophical Knowledge Production 
Amongst the exoticised torches and Confederate flags, shields and assault weapons were 
in the hands of many of the Unite the Right protestors during their march to protect a 
beloved statue of the Confederate soldier, Robert E. Lee (see figure 1). Ironically, Lee 
opposed the erection of statues and memorials of the bygone Confederate days because 
he believed they closed the wounds of the civil war rather than leaving them open to 
fester and agitate, in something akin to ressentiment. In the cultural memory of 
Confederate loyalists, Lee, who as a soldier was wounded during the Mexican-American 
war from 1846 to1848, represents the stoic, hard male body that has been forfeited in the 
softening of the nation. Sara Ahmed makes a striking correlation between softness and 
the nation in right-wing rhetoric: “indeed, the metaphor of ‘soft touch’ suggests that the 
nation’s borders and defenses are like skin.”41 I enter “softness” into the discourse 
because President Trump reminds his audience that America’s borders must become hard 
with cement walls and military outfitting—a hard nation is hardly a vulnerable nation. 
Indeed, the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville heeded Trump’s wisdom, embodying 
the hardness of their beloved male hero through the clinging to shields, kevlar, and 
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Figure 1: Participants in the Unite the Right Rally with shields, kevlar, and tiki torches. 
weapons as if America was entrenched in a civil war over a softening nation. 
Unfortunately for the protestors, their skin is not chemically augmented or supernaturally 
imbued with impermeability like so many heroes that have filled cinema with narratives 
and myths of an America (as the centre of the world) in need of protecting from an alien 
invasion. What I deduce from Charlottesville and the political-philosophical responses to 
September 11, 2001, is a somewhat irresolvable sense of vulnerability and invulnerability 
that, I argue, finds its acme in the “time of terror.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this section, I propose that statues, symbolic edifices, and the national body itself, 
stand in for all other white wounded bodies. Slavoj Žižek makes the observation that in 
the media coverage of September 11, 2001, “it is surprising how little of the actual 
carnage we see—no dismembered bodies, no blood, no desperate faces of dying 
people.”42 To be sure, 9/11 has largely been memorialized as the moment of the 
American nation coming together or unifying. Hence, the absent imagery of the dead and 
wounded bodies of almost 9000 persons at the site of Ground Zero. In New York, the 
9/11 Memorial and Museum as well as the Ground Zero Museum Workshop are 
dedicated to preserving the memory of 9/11, offering contrasting imagery that gives 
credence to Žižek’s observation. Particularly with the photo collection curated in the 
Ground Zero Museum, viewers bear witness to pillars of smoke and fire, the torched and 
contorted steel skeleton of the World Trade Center, and the stoic first responders 
                                                 
42 Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real (London: Verso, 2003), 15. 
17 
 
attending to the disaster, who are predominantly white men that are depicted as hard 
bodies. Even Bush in his address to the nation, as quoted earlier, seemed to substitute 
bodily injury with infrastructural damage. In other words, the wound that tends to 
represent Ground Zero is seemingly represented without the materiality of wounded 
human bodies. As I show, the nation and its symbols are depicted as always at risk and as 
vulnerable in place of white bodies in an expanding archive of terror. Indeed, these 
archives and other representations of 9/11 (philosophical or otherwise) foreclose from 
view the materiality of wounded bodies within the visual and textual fields.  
 Yet, in juxtaposition to white bodies, racialized bodies are frequently depicted as 
injured, damaged, or pathologically unable to “heal” in these visual and textual fields. 
Commenting on Canadian representations of Indigenous persons within the neoliberal 
industries of medicine and care, Sherene Razack explains that Canadians have become 
familiarized with Indigenous bodies as ontologically vulnerable, and, as such, “sickness 
and dysfunction” populate law, medicine, and government documents that frame or 
picture Indigenous persons.43 The literature of terrorist or terrorism studies dutifully 
renders terrorist qua Muslim bodies as mentally debilitated or wounded by social and 
cultural upbringing as a way to explain their vulnerability to indoctrination into the so-
called barbarism of Islam and radical extremism.44 In other words, the vulnerability of 
racialized bodies is openly rendered as a natural fact of existence rather than something 
that can be prevented or protected.  
 Alongside these archives, offering a visual depiction of the unequal distribution of 
vulnerable and wounded bodies in the visual field, is what W.J.T. Mitchell has coined as 
the “Abu Ghraib Archive.” With the invasion of Iraq underway by America, photos of the 
Abu Ghraib detention centre surfaced, depicting Arab and Muslim bodies being tortured, 
humiliated, and wounded by American soldiers. Characterizing these photos as war 
images, Mitchell chillingly paints the picture of these photos’ purpose: “the wounds are 
not meant to inflict pain on the actual victim. They are meant to be transmitted in visual 
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or verbal images that will terrorize and traumatize the victim’s kinfolk.”45 In these 
documented scenes of captivity, not only do these photos relate, as Hartman suggested 
earlier, injury and personhood, but they relate terror and enjoyment, engendering the very 
subjectivity of whiteness as invulnerable to injury.46 As Butler points out in her own 
reading of this archive, bound up in the act of torture is both the production of the Arab 
(or Muslim) subject and the white subject. Butler offers an important insight, however, 
into how whiteness is pictured in its very absence outside these photos’ frames.47 Butler 
attends to the ways in which this archive—as well as the broader Euro-American media 
empire—renders “the [white] subject’s own destructiveness as righteous and its own 
destructibility unthinkable.”48 In the case of the archive of terror, by concealing or 
precluding injured white bodies through specific framing techniques within both the 
visual and textual fields, whiteness tames or coaxes its anxiety towards its own 
destructibility, which is less the unthinkable, and more an open secret. As such, I think 
through below how Euro-American philosophical-political knowledge production after 
September 11, 2001 conceals wounded white bodies for them to merely surface on the 
edge of the frame.  
2.3.1 Ontology of Vulnerability 
Theorizing bodies and violence, Butler posits a fundamental ontology of vulnerability 
shared by all life forms. In an attempt to understand mourning, grievability, and violence 
after September 11, 2001, Butler refers to this ontology in terms of precarity. For Butler, 
life is inherently precarious, and through recognizing this precarity that belongs to every 
organic being, the Euro-American philosophical-political project can properly think 
through community in a globalized, interconnected world. In light of this shared 
precarity, Butler asks: “Is there a way that we might struggle for autonomy in many 
spheres, yet also consider the demands that are imposed on us by living in a world of 
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beings who are, by definition, physically dependent on one another, physically vulnerable 
to one another?”49 Indeed, Butler attempts to disavow any shame or fear that one might 
feel living in their vulnerability. In fact, vulnerability for Butler opens up, aside from the 
possibility of destruction, the possibility for support, care, and being together.50 As such, 
for Butler, vulnerability is something that must be embraced rather than rejected—
especially in a War on Terror that is contingent upon bodily vulnerability, both in the 
sense that the enemy is something to be destroyed and September 11, 2001 reminded the 
world that Euro-American empire does indeed share vulnerability with the rest of this 
world, despite centuries of myths that suggest otherwise. 
 In this ontology, Butler theorizes the body, of course, but a body which seems to 
transcend the work of racializing technologies. In other words, Butler does not place 
enough critical pressure on the ways in which vulnerability is unequally distributed 
within racializing assemblages and technologies. I think Butler is right in saying that “the 
body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the flesh expose us to the gaze 
of others, but also to touch, and to violence.”51 But how this vulnerability is lived—how 
it materializes across time and space—is radically different for racialized bodies where 
vulnerability is not only their lived experience, but is what white supremacist projects, 
such as settler-colonialism, exploit for their continued opulence.  
 Yet, an even more pressing problem emerges from Butler’s ontology of 
vulnerability: whiteness rears its head at the periphery of Butler’s ontology. Thobani, 
responding to a host of white feminist scholars, shrewdly points out that their responses 
to the War on Terror, including Butler’s, articulate new, privileged formulations of 
whiteness. Critiquing Butler, Thobani writes, “the use of such ‘primal vulnerability’ as 
the primary lens for an examination of an imperialist war places her discussion in a 
liberal-individualist frame so abstract as to severely hinder understandings of how geo-
political power relations are being restructured.”52 To put it another way, Butler avoids 
how vulnerability is redistributed in the War on Terror through racializing technologies, 
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neoliberal agendas, and globalization, which function to naturalize this unequal 
distribution of vulnerability. Thobani makes one more point that is important to consider: 
by positing vulnerability as something necessarily ontological to life, Butler invisibilises 
whiteness and its imperial pet projects, continuing a long-standing tradition of “racial 
power” in the Enlightenment heritage.53 Certainly, whiteness is present in its absence in 
this ontology of vulnerability like white bodies are present in their absence from the 
photos’ frames in the Abu Ghraib archive.  
2.3.2 Wounds To Come 
Whereas Butler theorizes bodily vulnerability in response to the War on Terror, Derrida 
and Baudrillard think through vulnerability in terms of a temporality of the wound. 
However, the wound becomes symbolic insofar as structures and monuments are 
rendered as metonyms for the body itself in their reading of September 11, 2001. The 
open wound on American symbolism haunts the status of invulnerability that America 
claimed prior to 9/11. In their own way, they invisibilise whiteness, particularly as 
something injurable, insofar as they avoid disclosing the materiality of the body within 
the rubble of Ground Zero, the collateral damage of drone strikes, and the thousands of 
wounded veterans who return home from one invasion after the other. Indeed, the wound 
they characterize is symbolic in essence, representing a closed, paranoid temporality 
where only one possible future informs the present: that of the next terrorist attack, which 
demands an impossible level of preparedness and preventative measures. Of course, this 
instills unease in the neoliberal machinery that feeds from fine-tuned calculations of 
profit and risk. Yet, that does not mean bodily wounds of whiteness are completely 
veiled. Instead, they fester on the margins of these responses. As Elaine Scarry writes, 
recounting the structure of war, “human wounds are not […] escorted out of view but are 
instead escorted from the center of view to the margins.”54 As such and anxiously, 
glimpses of the injured white body appear in their philosophical dialogue with the War on 
Terror.  
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 Through the cinematography of disaster, Giovanna Borradori introduces her 
seminal text, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, evoking the atmosphere of the apocalypse 
in her description of September 11, 2001. Like any vivid recounting of the event(s), it 
reads like a script from a movie.55 Even though Borradori recalls people plummeting 
from the Twin Towers (into the margins), her emphasis focuses on the infrastructural 
devastation that accompanied the attacks. A burning America becomes the protagonist of 
her “philosophical story” that she wishes to tell as she evokes the iconography of 
civilizational progress of the nation: 
All communication was suddenly cut: the phone and the Internet were 
down, no public transportation was available, the airports were closed and 
so were railway stations and bridges […] As the World Trade Center 
collapsed, the escalation of events looked thoroughly open-ended: the 
Pentagon was in flames, the President evacuated, and reports of an 
explosion at the Capitol had just created a stampede of senators and 
congressmen. Until the fourth hijacked plane was confirmed to have gone 
down in Pennsylvania, like many, I was convinced that the worst was still 
to come.56 
Skyscrapers, streets, malls, and monuments compose the materiality of the body politic, 
names itself America. Built to endure like any good civilization, these structures were 
destined to withstand the test of time. Yet, as Baudrillard acknowledges in his 
fetishization of the Twin Tower’s architecture, the American Dream included within its 
myth the disappearance of the Twin Towers, and by extension, of course, the crumbling 
of the urban centre, which loops into the visual field with every summer blockbuster 
season.57 Perhaps this helps to explain the extreme fascination with the reinvigoration of 
history at the moment of the (short-lived) demise of neoliberal capital’s centre. As 
                                                 
55 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), ix. Borradori is clear in her remembering of the 
morning that the “apocalypse” unfolding around her and on her television was like a movie.  
56 Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, x. My emphasis.  
57 Antonio Sánchez-Escalonilla. “Hollywood and the Rhetoric of Panic: The Popular Genres of Action and 
Fantasy in the Wake of the 9/11 Attacks.” Journal of Popular Film and Television 38, no. 1 (2010): 14. 
22 
 
Borradori reminds us, this was “the most devastating terrorist attack in history.”58 Of 
course, one could muddy the waters here and interrogate the claim by asking: whose 
history? What is the onto-epistemological content of a terrorist attack? Nevertheless, two 
things will hopefully appear apparent in the readings of Derrida and Baudrillard. On the 
one hand, the wound that is September 11, 2001 references a material mark on the body 
politic that is America. On the other hand, this wound marks a temporal fear and anxiety 
towards the future commonly characterized as a fear of the next 9/11.  
 Indeed, Derrida also focuses on this infrastructural carnage, effectuating a 
relationship between wound and the materiality of the urban centre. He also discusses 
this wound in terms of his philosophical concept of the “to come.” In Derrida’s rendering 
of the event, the infrastructural becomes—to echo Ahmed—like skin, like the flesh of the 
nation, and as such it becomes fragile and vulnerable in its exposure to the (hostile) 
world. Derrida writes an eloquent musing on what the attack means in perhaps its failure 
to mean anything and the stickiness of the name-date that finds its residue in the rubble:  
Is, then, what was touched, wounded, or traumatized by this double crash 
only some particular thing or other, a "what" or a "who," buildings, strategic 
urban structures, symbols of political, military, or capitalist power, or a 
considerable number of people of many different origins living on the body 
of a national territory that had remained untouched for so long? No, it was not 
only all that but perhaps especially, through all that, the conceptual, semantic, 
and one could even say hermeneutic apparatus that might have allowed one to 
see coming, to comprehend, interpret, describe, speak of, and name 
"September 11"—and in so doing to neutralize the traumatism and come to 
terms with it through a "work of mourning." What I am suggesting here might 
appear abstract and overly reliant on what seems like a simple conceptual or 
discursive activity, a question of knowledge; it is as if I were in fact content 
to say that what is terrible about "September 11," what remains "infinite" in 
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this wound, is that we do not know what it is and so do not know how to 
describe, identify, or even name it.59 
For Derrida, September 11, 2001 is the absolute event because there is no name for it that 
could ever be exhumed from the ruins. Further, there is no prior episteme of vulnerability 
that could have calculated it. Hence, the infernally inadequate name-date, 9/11.  
 If the philosopher might be a physician of the political, then Derrida offers an 
important pathological diagnosis of the event qua wound.60 The event under investigation 
becomes very much a wound for Derrida—a permanent mark on temporality and 
historicity which remains in the purview of the American visual field. As such, “wound” 
as diagnostic language appears five more times throughout Derrida’s interview. 
However, Derrida seems to locate this wound not so much in the geographical 
coordinates of Ground Zero, but in language itself. The wound is the name-date, 
September 11, 2001 or 9/11. 
 As a philosopher of the metaphysical trace, which is the sinew that connects the 
past and future with the present, the name-date becomes an investment into more than the 
pain of the past injury like Brown’s ressentiment.61 The political function of the wound, 
for Derrida, is contingent upon the notion that a future wound or a future pain is always 
to come. Derrida writes, “it comes from the to-come, from the future, a future so radically 
to come that it resists even the grammar of the future anterior.”62 This concept of the to-
come describes not so much a deferral, which he might be known for with his tacit 
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monument excavated from différance, but rather the calling forth of future iterations.63 
These future iterations do not fulfill the destiny of their coming, however, as one does not 
know what it is in advance of its arrival. As such, the possibility of the to-come remains 
forever (im)possible: hence its ocular trick of deferral. The nature of the to-come, of this 
wound, generates the affect and effect of terror. Recall Borradori who explained in scenes 
unfolding on her television: she did not know if the worst was yet to come.  
 In this excavation of the wound from the site of Ground Zero, Derrida displaces 
the material bodies that bear this wound, or perhaps buries them further beneath the 
double crash he brings to our attention. Derrida asserts the ontological claim, almost 
antithetically to Butler’s ontology, that America was once invulnerable insofar as it 
remained “untouched” for so long. In the unforeseen event of being touched by the other, 
America recoiled in its newly discovered vulnerability and the fear of being touched once 
again. I will reiterate Thobani’s critique of Butler and white feminists here as I believe it 
applies equally in Derrida’s and Borradori’s case: “This framing foregrounds, however 
unintentionally, the experience of the (white) American subject, who has suddenly and 
graphically discovered its own vulnerability.”64 Indeed, this framing—intentionally or 
unintentionally—reproduces whiteness as the only imaginable wounded subject, despite 
failing to draw attention to the (white) bodies—home and abroad—that suffer from 
material wounds.65 Democratic America unifies within Derrida’s discourse as the 
wounded nation.  
2.3.3 Wound as the Absolute Historical Event 
If “an event always inflicts a wound in the everyday course of history,” as Derrida 
postulates, then what or whose wounds count as wounds in the grand theatre of Euro-
American historicity?66 What is the historical content of September 11, 2001? The 
content of history has been debated since the eruption of post-modernism, since the fall 
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of the Soviet Union and the big win of global capitalism, and now since 9/11. Regardless, 
9/11 might find its “historical content” rather controversially in the touching of what 
went untouched for so long, that is, the double crash. But as Jean-Joseph Goux bluntly 
puts it: “it is not as if a meteor fell on New York City on September 11, 2001. Even if the 
tragic events of 9/11 are disconcerting politically as well as morally, even if 9/11 upsets 
all of our ethical, religious, and strategic categories, it was not completely unexpected.”67 
Goux’s observation is not too distant from Derrida’s own auto-immune diagnostic 
reading of the event insofar as the neoliberal order of things lined up the dominos for the 
faintest of touch for them all to fall over. However, Derrida, in preserving the historical 
content or symbolic significance of 9/11, concedes to the onto-epistemological 
redundancy that “we do not know what it is and so do not know how to describe.”68 
 Baudrillard offers a different reading of September 11, 2001—and yet, he shares 
some sensibilities with Derrida. For Baudrillard too, September 11, 2001 re-energized 
history, and, as such, Baudrillard possesses an unfailing faith in the symbolic significance 
of this event. As he begins his collection of essays on the attack, “throughout the 
stagnation of the 1990s, events were ‘on strike’ […] well, the strike is over now. Events 
are not on strike anymore. With the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, we 
might even be said to have before us the absolute event, the ‘mother’ of all events.”69 In 
naming September 11, 2001 as the “mother of all events,” Baudrillard contorts the 
comfortable, linear course of history. Like Derrida’s trace, September 11, 2001 radically 
shifts the frame in which events are henceforth perceived. As the matriarch of history, it 
engenders all events: past and future. History, then, hinges on the “absolute event” that is 
9/11. Yet, this is all quite precariously conditional on the symbolic significance of 
September 11, 2001, which Goux rightfully troubles. In other words, September 11, 
2001, among other things noted above, does not necessarily symbolize the inevitable 
convergence of temporalities and histories into the apex of Western time (the West meets 
East, or Islam meets secularism, intertwining their destinies henceforth). It was already 
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happening, and 9/11 is but one consequence of these collisions—this collision was 
merely materially demarcated on American territory. Goux insists, “What makes current 
events enigmatic is that they are the consequence of a tremendous and dangerous 
collision of two temporalities and temporal modes.”70 To be sure, these temporal 
collisions are traceable to at least the violent contacts and collisions that narrate 
colonialism. Ultimately, within the context of Baudrillard’s analysis the work of the 
exceptional signifier in securing a particular narrative of Euro-American history that 
posits America as the exceptionally wounded subject, alienating alternative histories that 
suggest the contrary.  
 By way of example, Baudrillard determines that America persisted without any 
notable wound in the course of history until the fateful morning of the double crash. 
Baudrillard writes: 
The Americans lacked such a wound (at Pearl Harbor they suffered an act of 
war, not a symbolic attack). An ideal reverse of fortune for a nation at least 
wounded at its heart and free, having atoned for it, to exert its power in all 
good conscience. A situation science fiction dreamed of from the beginning: 
that some obscure force would wipe them out and which, until that point, 
merely existed in their unconscious (or some other recess of their minds).71 
Baudrillard then proceeds to fantasize and fetishize the architecture of the Twin Towers. 
The event earns its status as absolute, it seems, by both its architectural and capital 
materiality (as the hub of World Trade). How do so many historical catastrophes in the 
geographical context of America go unwarranted as significant events? What renders it 
possible to make the claim that America lacked a wound for so long? Indeed, Baudrillard 
centres a symbol of whiteness in American historicity as the ultimate bearer of wounds.  
 I am struck, however, by Baudrillard’s tracing of “wound” to the fancies of 
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science fiction. Hollywood has proven that the disappearance of the Twin Towers, and 
civilized America more broadly is a constant paranoia embedded in the consciousness of 
America. However, America’s dreaming of this disappearance might find a historical 
trace in the institution of slavery. In naming the Black Man as a wound—“the symbol of 
a person at the mercy of a whip and suffering”—Mbembe offers an all too apparent 
alternative historical rendering of the wound.72 Too easily can philosophical-political 
knowledge production render racialized bodies outside the history or the body of the 
nation. As such, alternative histories of wounded subjects and bodies hang in the wake of 
Euro-American empire.  
  For example, Mbembe asserts that the spectre of disappearance, extinction, and 
genocide of whiteness that haunts white America exists with the plantation. Mbembe 
writes, “A paranoid institution, the plantation lived under a perpetual regime of fear. It 
combined aspects of a camp, a pen, a paramilitary society. The slave master could deploy 
one form of coercion after another, create chains of dependence between him and his 
slaves, and alternate between terror and generosity, but his existence was always haunted 
by the specter of elimination.”73 In brief, then, whiteness does not find its fears, its 
anxieties, and its paranoia exclusively within the realm of science fiction. Extinction, 
extermination, and genocide continue to fester in the recess of white minds and memory, 
manifesting, as we will now see, as a paranoia towards the im/migrant and black bodies 
in newfound institutions that take the shape of the camp.  
2.3.4 Preparing for the Worst To Come 
Reading the work of Frank Wilderson as well as considering her own blackness in 
relation to the wake of slavery, Christina Sharpe notes that black wounds are not 
analogous in any way, shape, or form to other renditions in the politics of wounds. As 
Sharpe writes, “the suffering of black people cannot be analogized; […] ‘we’ do not 
experience suffering on the same plain of conflict, since the Black is characterized, as 
Wilderson tells us, by gratuitous violence.”74 When tracing the politics of the wound, 
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then, through subaltern politics, Enlightenment-inspired philosophical-projects, and 
national discourses in the wake of September 11, 2001, I do not seek to catalogue or 
compare wounds, injury, and suffering. In short, the wound that belongs to racialized 
bodies is often not an analogy nor analogous, but a lived, material experience that at 
times becomes discursively displaced in its reality by the twin discourses of unification 
and healing (that belong to white nationalism).  
 Sharpe offers an additional poignant moment of reflection in her reading of black 
death and black maiming that is an everyday lived experience. In light of these “paranoid 
temporalities,” that is, the fear that the worst is yet to come, evoked by Borradori, 
Derrida, and Baudrillard and institutionalized by Trump, Bush, and other white 
nationalists, it is Sharpe who refuses the naturalization of this temporality. Sharpe writes, 
“the constant production of Black death is and as necessary returns us to the singularity. 
But just as the weather is always ripe for Black death, the singularity also produces Black 
resistances and refusals.”75 In other words, instead of conceding to a politics of wounds 
that engenders paranoia, which for whiteness unleashes storms of black and Arab death, 
Sharpe maintains the possibility for a future that is otherwise through resistance and 
refusal. Indeed, alternative temporalities—thinking otherwise than the epistemic 
trajectory preordains—has been a significant political project for radical black thinkers as 
well as for Indigenous scholars and activists. In perhaps what is his most renowned text, 
The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon writes, “Let us not lose time in useless laments or 
sickening mimicry. Let us leave this Europe which never stops talking of man yet 
massacres him at every one of its street corners, at every corner of the world.”76 For 
Fanon, finishing his final text on the horizon of death, progress or healing may only be 
achieved outside the purviews of Euro-American philosophical-political knowledge 
production—knowledge which routinely hierarchizes the human body into genres for 
exploitation and elimination to preserve and protect whiteness.77 
 It is always the black parent, however, in the context of policed black bodies, who 
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must prepare their child for the worst possible outcome that is scarcely included within 
the paranoid temporalities of whiteness. In 2016, the publisher Jubilee released the video, 
“Dear Child – When Black Parents Have to Give the Talk,” revealing the necessary and 
ongoing conversation black parents have with their children about living in a world 
where their bodies are targeted for violence and extinction.78 “I need you to always be 
prepared and be on your guard,” one mother says to the camera with a solemn look in her 
eye. The highly personal conversations repeated in the short video showcase how persons 
that are racialized by state institutions must always be prepared for the worst possible 
confrontation with whiteness (either in its institutional form or as it is embodied by a 
white police officer and their doppelgängers, the Unite the Right protestors). Of course, 
after 9/11 the American discourse along with economical and foreign policy shifted to 
being prepared for the next terrorist attack in what Deepa Kumar has called the “Bush 
Doctrine”.79 I proceed, then, in the final section to think through what “preparedness” 
denotes within the paranoid temporalities of white nationalism.  
2.4 Paranoid Temporalities: Preparedness in a Time of 
Terror 
The streets of Charlottesville on August 11, 2018, reflected the paramilitary impulse at 
the centre of whiteness that Mbembe speaks of, where white bodies brandished firearms 
in an attempt to “take back” what they believed rightfully belonged to them. Postcolonial 
critic Anne McClintock rightfully characterizes this impulse as imperialism’s—and thus 
by extension whiteness’—megalomania.80 Proud white nationalist Christopher Cantwell 
is the epitome of this megalomaniacal character. In the 2017 documentary co-produced 
by Vice and HBO, Charlottesville: Race and Terror, correspondent Elle Reeve 
interviewed Cantwell in his hotel room in the concluding night of the march. He casually 
tossed an AR-15 style assault rifle onto his bed along with three pistols and a knife. He 
tells Reeves with a crooked smile:  
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I came pretty well prepared for this thing today. Kal-tech 93AT, .380 cp. 
Glock 19, 9mm. Ruger LC9, also 9mm. And there’s a knife. Well, I 
actually have another AK in that bag over there. You lose track of your 
guns, huh? I’d say it was worth it. We knew we were gonna meet a lot of 
resistance. The fact that nobody on our side died, I’d go ahead and call that 
points for us. The fact that none of our people killed anybody unjustly, I 
think is a plus for us. And I think that we showed our rivals that we won’t 
be cowed.81  
As a harbinger of the ethno-state, Cantwell’s exorbitant display of potential violence 
reveals this megalomaniacal character animating white nationalism. Following 
McClintock, however, I wish to read this moment in the hotel room as an ambivalent 
scene. Reading the scene of “discovery” in the colonial literary narrative, McClintock 
writes, “[this] augural scene […] becomes a scene of ambivalence, suspended between 
imperial megalomania, with its fantasy of unstoppable rapine—and a contradictory fear 
of engulfment, with its fantasy of dismemberment and emasculation.”82 If there is any 
discovery to be claimed here it is the discovery of America’s vulnerability with 
September 11, 2001. As much as Cantwell displays his capacity to kill, wound, and maim 
his perceived enemies (in which he describes as commies, animalized blacks, and the 
Jewish community), beneath his bravado is paranoia, which is exposed in his military-
esque preparation for the march.  
 In this final section, I contend that there is a tangible relationship between white 
embodiment and the paranoid temporalities produced by whiteness. That is, whiteness 
embodies hardness, such as in the form of pseudo-military garb, in anticipation of future 
hurt. Whiteness embodies in such a way to prepare for the worst possible outcome. 
Indeed, the analysis could find its beginning in an exegesis of the to-come. That is to say, 
Cantwell totes an exaggerated arsenal with him into Charlottesville because he is always 
thinking of the next attack to come. After all, Cantwell cites September 11, 2001 as one 
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of many reasons for the increasing visibility of white nationalists like himself.83 Other 
Alt-Righters, too, cite 9/11 as the penultimate terrorist attack, speculating what the “next 
9/11” might look like in actuality. Regardless, in preparing to do pre-emptive violence, 
Cantwell is preparing for an(other) attack on whiteness. Another voice in the Alt-Right—
Vincent Law, a blogger for Alt-Right think tanks, media outlets, and podcasts—
frequently cites the white genocide by and white dispossession from im/migrants and 
terrorists as necessitating a call to action. Indeed, for Law the right must unite and arm 
themselves to take the fight to the tyrannical left-leaning government and invading illegal 
aliens. Of course, these sentiments were reverberated throughout the Unite the Right 
rally. Angered after the municipality prohibited the rally from hosting Robert Spencer 
and other white voices at Emancipation Park, a former Grand Wizard expressed his anger 
towards the continued ethnic cleansings of whites in America, which was, for him, 
abetted by the government.84 In short, for the Unite the Right rally, the American way of 
life is (always already) at risk of future hurt.   
 The rhetoric shared by Alt-Righters, Trump, and other white nationalists is always 
in the future tense. As Derrida suggests, September 11, 2001 is hardly a memory. Instead, 
it is an open wound that offers predictive power for the future to come. Furthermore, 
white nationalists disassociate “genocide” from its historical and geographical contexts, 
to echo Mbembe, to invest in the supposedly ongoing suffering, vulnerability, and 
wounds of whiteness in the present and future.  
 These discursive maneuvers can be found within speeches by President Bush (and 
later President Trump). While the United States has been preparing for the worst possible 
outcome since at least the Cold War, September 11, 2001 offered the prime opportunity 
for President Bush to raise the debt ceiling, allowing the expanse and purchase of the 
military’s arsenal and investment into radical surveillance technologies. Reminding 
Americans of their new-found softness, Bush’s immediate response to 9/11 was to harden 
the nation in preparation against future attacks: 
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The next priority of my budget is to do everything possible to protect our 
citizens and strength our nation against the ongoing threat of another attack. 
Time and distance from the events of September 11th will not make us safer 
unless we act on its lessons. America is no longer protected by vast oceans. 
We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad.85 
Indeed, there is a striking resemblance between the embodiment of the Unite the Right 
rally and Bush’s discourse on a nation that needs to protect itself from further wounding. 
But it also expresses the seeding of ressentiment in (white) American nationalism to 
follow from Bush’s speech. In other words, America, Cantwell, and the Unite the Right 
rally believe they are always under threat within a hostile world, and where harm is 
always expressed in the future tense—as a paranoid temporality.  
2.4.1 Paranoid Temporalities  
Since the first ruminations of this thesis, I have been troubled with the catch phrase, “in a 
time of terror.” Perhaps originally popularized by Giovanni Borradori’s Philosophy in a 
Time of Terror, the phrase finds common use in advancing the theme of how a discipline 
or category of analysis radically changed after 9/11, much in the same way as the oft-
cited exceptionalisation by Adorno that there can be no poetry after Auschwitz. The 
phrase at once limits a temporal period—everything that came after September 11, 
2001—yet also simultaneously imposes a temporal uncertainty. When does this time of 
terror end? What is the limit of this so-called time of terror? Regardless of these fuzzy 
temporal boundaries, 9/11 qua wound has engendered what Puar calls a “paranoid 
temporality”; a term which I borrow to analyze how the politics of wounds might 
configure temporality in negative terms. Indeed, as Derrida and Baudrillard have 
demonstrated earlier, “wound” shares a specific affinity with history and temporality. Not 
only has a national wound reinvigorated the Euro-American project of historiography, 
but it has reshaped projects of memorialization into projects of not only “present pasts” 
but “present futures.”  
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 For Puar, temporality has become inextricably bound to paranoia. Puar writes that 
“this is a temporality of negative exuberance—for we are never safe enough, never 
healthy enough, never prepared enough.”86 Indeed, here Puar is indebted to the work of 
radical queer thinkers who think through temporality in terms of the queer subject and 
body that has been historically denied the promises offered by heteropatriarchy and 
instead offered foreclosed futures amidst the AIDS crisis. For queer thinkers, temporality 
became a question of creativity and a project of thinking the future outside 
heteronormative temporalities, which endlessly produce the same promised by 
heteropatriachy.87 However, Puar advances this paranoid temporality that has been 
renewed at a specific, timely historical juncture: the propagation, if not acceleration, of 
neoliberal projects of risk assessment and calculation globally in the wake of 9/11, 
alongside the emergence of homonationalist discourses that normalized the white gay 
male subject. Puar does not read the marriage of the two as mere coincidence. The white 
gay male subject just so happens to become a new expression of the nation and its 
sovereignty. The once-marginalized white gay male can participate in the middle class 
ideal—to harken back to Brown—and can thereby reproduce the same, in the form of 
white nationalism, but always as a project of progressive white nationalism against the 
backdrop of regressive cultural and racialized others. This historical moment, however, 
produces, as Puar observes, nothing but temporal uncertainty. Most importantly, for Puar, 
risk calculation is an attempt at ensuring the endless reproduction of the same, often 
against dismal future projections such as the next terrorist attack. Paranoid temporality, 
then, is “driven by imitation (repetition of the same or in the service of maintaining the 
same) rather than innovation (openness to disruption of the same, calling out to the 
new).”88 
 Already, Puar anticipates the interrogation of the “history-making” and the 
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“history-vanishing” that becomes part and parcel of the phrase, “in a time of terror.”89 
Grappling with the historical moment in which her project emerges, Puar writes, “The 
futures are much closer to us than any pasts. What does it mean to be examining, 
absorbing, feeling, reflecting on, and writing about the archive as it is being produced, 
rushing at us—literally, to entertain an unfolding archive?”90 Indeed, the future archive or 
body of knowledge rushes towards this project as the past seemingly both expands and 
recedes (it is a little less present as time moves forward). However, as Puar rightfully 
posits in her own reflection, these moments, events, or flashpoints refuse “the binary of 
watershed moment and turning point of radical change.”91 Hence, my own attempt to 
think through the historical continuities that can be uncovered within different temporal 
and geographical contexts. In other words: “this has meant in part less emphasis on 
historicization […] and [instead] a move toward collecting, shaping, and interrogating an 
archive that will be available for future historicization.”92 It has also meant, I argue, a 
resistance to the continued foreclosing of future possibilities ushered in by a paranoid 
temporality, which is ultimately sustained by Euro-American knowledge production. 
Indeed, this is what it will forever mean when Fanon writes in the context of 
decolonization, as quoted earlier, “let us not lose time in sickening mimicry” of the Euro-
American project (of whiteness in all its iterations).  
 Nevertheless, I must pose this question: if a paranoid temporality is eternally 
invested in reproducing the same, then how does it invest in both injured white 
nationalism as well as the embodiment of hard white bodies? Here, I would like to return 
to the statue of Robert E. Lee and the bodies that rallied to protect it. Indeed, the statue, 
which is located within the ironically named Emancipation Park, has been transformed 
into a battlefield of “present pasts” and “future presents.” To be sure, this battle also 
continues to thrive within the poisonous phrase “Make America Great Again,” which 
again serves to recall an almost forgotten time as a model for the future—but always 
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within an antagonistic relationship with a hostile world that imposes future hurt. This 
phrase, evoking a paranoid temporality, becomes a bulwark against the futures alternative 
to what the “again” promises. And so too does every statue of Robert E. Lee that rests on 
the mass graves of American prosperity. For the white nationalist, the only ointment for 
their wounds is a recalling of the “same” in the mold of the “again”.  
 As much as these statues preserve an idealized past—that is, what is beckoned 
like a ghost in the “again”—they carry with them the “myth of permanent progress”.93 
Indeed, Robert E. Lee as a statue might very well be America’s vexed angel of history. In 
thinking through the monument and its investment into memory, Andreas Huyssen 
argues that “memories of the twentieth century confront us not with a better life, but with 
a unique history of genocide and mass destruction that mars a priori any attempt to 
glorify the past […] Witnessing the ever-widening gap between rich and poor, the barely 
controlled meltdown of whole regional and national economies, and the return of war to 
the continent that spawned two world wars in the last century has surely brought with it 
significant entropy of our sense of future possibilities.”94 As McClintock might 
encourage an ambivalent reading of Cantwell and his cronies in the Unite The Right 
Rally, so too must these statues be read ambivalently with respect to memory and history. 
These statues encompass both the history and the future possibility of genocide and 
displacement, which white nationalists appropriate for the legitimization of their own 
belief in targeted genocide and displacement of whiteness. To cull these statues, to knock 
them down—for them to fall—is all too reminiscent of the iconic fall of the World Trade 
Centre (see figure 2). For the white nationalist, removal of these statues is akin to white 
genocide, injury, and the continued wounding of whiteness. As such, these statues, 
especially in the context of Charlottesville which resulted in the (celebrated) death of one 
person, require protection at all costs. In a word, the statue annotates this white 
nationalist’s politics of wounds. 
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Figure 2: A toppled confederate soldier monument, one of many through the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
President Bush’s speeches after 9/11 also effectuate this ambivalence, not only that of 
paranoia and megalomania, but of this entropy of future possibilities. In his address to the 
Republican National Convention during the onset of his second presidential campaign, 
Bush says: 
I believe in the energy and innovative spirit of America’s workers, 
entrepreneurs, farmers, and ranchers—so we unleashed energy with the 
largest tax relief in a generation. Because we acted, our economy is growing 
again, and creating jobs, and nothing will hold us back. I believe in the most 
solemn duty of the American President is to protect the American people. If 
America shows uncertainty or weakness in this decade, the world will drift 
toward tragedy. This will not happen on my watch.95 
Nearly fifteen years later, President-elect Donald Trump campaigned with the same 
promises of a better future, however, upping the ante alongside increased military 
spending with the promise of a “beautiful” border wall between the United States of 
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America and Mexico as well as a Muslim ban. Nevertheless, Bush’s speech here speaks 
in terms of temporality in much of the same way Trump’s vow to “Make America Great 
Again.” But it also speaks in terms of imperial rapine, on the one hand, and a fear of 
engulfment on the other. Still reeling from the “tragedy” of September 11, 2001, 
President Bush, as once the world’s great decider, saw to it to “protect” America from a 
(hostile) world. Indeed, wherever Bush spoke of “protection,” along with it came notions 
of the future attack and geographical boundaries. In short, to protect means, in the context 
of the War on Terror, to thwart the enemy in advance of their arrival through drone 
strikes, ceaseless military campaigns, and, of course, the dropping of the unprecedented 
M.O.A.B..96 
2.4.2 Conclusion: Bodies in Advance of Their Arrival 
This chapter has predominantly focused on the temporality of the discourses and symbols 
tethered to the politics of wounds, scarcely considering the significance of temporality’s 
relationship to bodies. While neoliberal commitments to risk assessment and predictive 
analysis of “future threats” might at first appear as petty discursive maneuvers to give 
credence to bombastic policy making, it is certainly grounded in alarming material and 
spatial relations.97As such, with this chapter’s conclusion approaching and in anticipation 
of the second chapter, I wish to shift focus onto the body once again. Indeed, the 
algorithmic work of neoliberal machinery—whether that of war, surveillance, or 
commerce—triangulates bodies in advance of their arrival. As Nandita Biswas 
Mellamphy expertly puts it, “the American security paradigm consists not in identifying a 
statistical relationship between data on past activities and future terrorist attacks; rather, 
the goal is to develop the capability to use algorithmic analysis to identify ‘a potential 
terrorist, a subject who is not yet fully in view, who may be unnamed and as yet 
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unrecognizable’.”98 Of course, the data under the duress of neoliberalism’s centrifuge is 
always already racialized. Piercing the epistemic unknown to pinpoint a future terrorist 
threat or body always already preordains a racialized body. In other words, there at least 
persists an a priori epistemic object within these algorithms: the pathology of criminality, 
terrorism, and threat belongs to racialized bodies.  
 Interrogating state surveillance and the police apparatus in Canada, Robyn 
Maynard makes the argument that—in the context of settler colonialism—“to be black is 
to be perceived as a risk.”99 Indeed, as a risk, the settler state attempts to detain, 
incarcerate, remove, and deport these racialized bodies to protect white bodies. Then, this 
neoliberal technology of risk assessment advances the claims of white vulnerability or as 
a body in need of protection. To be sure, a history of white protectionism extends a few 
centuries as critical race and postcolonial critics have shown. Regardless, neoliberalism 
has altered the ways in which bodies “surface,” to borrow Ahmed’s parlance.  
 This constant “anxiety of annihilation” (i.e., white genocide) and fetishization of 
future hurt felt by white bodies, I wish to suggest, demarcates both the ontological and 
epistemological limits of bodies in terms of their surfacing, or how they come to surface, 
both materially and within textual and visual fields. While this assertion might rest in 
phenomenology or existentialism, I couch it within the political thought of Fanon and 
Mbembe (to which Ahmed picks up certain threads for her own phenomenological 
project, which I unfortunately do not have the room to tread in the detail it very much 
deserves). Nevertheless, writing about the colonizer or Euro-American subject more 
broadly, Mbembe posits that: 
Colonialism had to a large extent consisted in a constant effort to separate: 
on one side, my living body; on the other, all those ‘body-things’ 
surrounding it—with my human flesh as the fundamental locus through 
which all other exterior ‘flesh things’ and ‘flesh meats’ exist for me. On 
one side therefore, is me—the basic nexus and source of orientation in the 
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world—while, on the other, are the others with whom, however, I can 
never completely fuse—other with whom I may relate, yet never genuinely 
engage in relations of reciprocity or mutual implication.100 
From this passage, I derive two observations about colonialism’s genesis of being that 
can be applied to white subjectivity and its anxiety of annihilation in the War on Terror. 
The first, is the genesis of megalomania in the white subject insofar as all fleshy things 
exist in proximity and in relation to its own flesh. The second, as has been explored 
already, this megalomaniac relationship begets the “anxiety of annihilation” by virtue of 
this proximity. And indeed, there is a certain discovery of one’s own vulnerability in the 
desire of mastery and exploitation of these “fleshy” others, but also the discovery of 
bodily borders. As such, the flesh of the other becomes an object of fear, necessitating 
either mastery or disposal of its flesh.  
 Hence the troubling ambivalence in the exclamation that Fanon interrogates in 
Black Skin, White Masks: “Look! A Negro!” This exclamation, which is my second 
observation, marks the flesh of the other, constitutes a relation between the two bodies, 
and orients the world. Rather than read this scene as a moment of interpolation, which it 
very much is, I instead read it as a peculiar commentary on the embodiment of whiteness 
in relation to blackness. Considering the condescending paternalism inherent to colonial 
discourses, it is most ironic that it is a child who is first identified as the one who utters 
this remark. Fanon writes: 
“Look! A Negro!” It was a passing sting. I attempted a smile. 
“Look! A Negro!” The circle was gradually getting smaller. I was really 
enjoying myself. 
“Maman, look, a Negro; I’m scared!”101 
In the conclusion of this scene, Fanon narrates his laughter at the proposition of this 
white child’s experience of being scared. For what does the child have to fear of the black 
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body, considering the long history of white terror enacted on the surface of black bodies? 
Nevertheless, it is in this exchange of fear that two bodies surface: the white body as 
vulnerable and in search of protection from the mother and the black body as an object of 
fear. For Fanon, “the black man is a ‘phobogenic’ object, provoking anxiety.”102 Fanon 
continues: 
The choice of the phobic object is thus overdetermined. Such an object 
does not come out of the void of nothingness; in some situations it has 
previously evoked an affect in the patient. The phobia is the latent 
presence of this affect on the core of his world; there is an organization 
that has been given a form. For the object, naturally, need not be there, it is 
enough that somewhere the object exists: is a possibility.103 
 Here, Fanon might offer an interesting insight that might be applied to 
Islamic/black phobia after 9/11. Unlike Ahmed’s phenomenology, which suggests that 
bodies surface in proximity to each other, Fanon allows us to think through how some 
bodies surface in advance of the arrival of their phobogenic object; that is to say, these 
bodies are present in their absence. In other words, the object of fear need not be 
materially present or for that matter materially exist—it is enough that it exists in the 
cultural imagination and that there is a possibility of its arrival. Ahmed gestures towards 
this notion in the 2015 afterword of The Cultural Politics of Emotions.104 Fear and 
anxiety toward a phobogenic object, racialized as a Muslim body or black body, 
particularly in the form of an anticipation of future hurt or future terrorist attack, surfaces 
whiteness as both vulnerable and protected. Fanon exposes this duality through the 
depictions of whiteness as the child, who represents vulnerability, and as the mother who 
represents protection. Hence, the intense desire to always be prepared in advance of these 
bodies’ arrival and in advance of future hurt—whether that means the military outfitting 
of Unite the Right Protestors, the building of absurd walls at borders, or the gratuitous 
expansion of military spending. 
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3  Chapter 2 - “Bonne Blessure!”: The Biopolitical Logics 
of Captivity in French Algeria105 
For eight years you have been in this country. 
And no part of this enormous wound has held you back in any way. 
And no part of this enormous wound has pushed you in anyway. 
You have been free to discover yourself at last as such you are. 
-Frantz Fanon, “Letter to a Frenchman” 
In this unending colony the truth stood naked, but the settlers 
preferred it hidden away or at least dressed: the Natives had to 
love them and all they had done, something in the way a cruel 
father is still loved by the children who are wounded by his 
selfish hands.__________________________________________ 
-Taiaiake Alfred, “Foreword” to Red Skin, White Masks 
3.1 Introduction:  
“Algeria is too controversial,” historian Martin Evans muses in his nearly four-hundred-
page study of the Algerian war for independence.106 Between 1954 and 1962, Algeria 
staged one of the twentieth century’s bloodiest decolonial movements. This eight-year 
war resulted in the expulsion of nearly one million French colons and the death of an 
estimated three-hundred thousand Algerians, including both civilians and Front de 
liberation nationale (FLN) combatants. While the official record imagines the war 
beginning November 1, 1954, collective consensus with Indigenous Algerians describes 
the conflict finding its humble beginning with the Sétif Massacre that took place between 
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May 8 and May 12, 1945.107 Upon the return of French and Algerian soldiers from World 
War Two, celebrating victory, Algerian protestors—armed with the green and white 
flags—rallied for their own emancipation from French settler colonialism. French police 
attempted to confiscate the flags as well as arresting protestors on mass. However, after a 
gunshot rang through the crowded streets of the market town of Sétif, leaving a young 
Algerian boy dead, the growing tension between French colons and Indigenous Algerians 
quickly transformed into outright violence. To put down this nationalism once and for all, 
Governor-General Yves Chataigneu mandated a nationwide state of siege. Ten thousand 
French soldiers were deployed, resulting in the executions, torture, and bombing of 
Indigenous Algerians. The French engine of massacre revved across the Algerian bled, 
reaching the market town of Guelma. Despite the massacres finally ending on May 24, 
“French soldiers wanted to ram home who had won and who had lost […] Soldiers also 
had made rings out of fingers mutilated from the dead, war trophies that would be 
bragged about for years to come.”108 Nine years later, a struggle for independence would 
blossom across Algeria as the FLN utilized every means deemed necessary to remind the 
colons that there was no French Algeria and that the pied noirs did not belong in Algeria.  
 My research for this chapter began with an investigation of the containment of 
Algeria’s war for independence as an object of knowledge shrouded within controversy. 
Either the controversy emerges as a question of what the acceptable limits of torture are 
in the name of the civilizing mission or to what extent can France’s excessive responses 
through force towards militant nationalisms, such as the FLN, be justified. After all, the 
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FLN is commonly framed as a terrorist organization rather than a complex, layered 
political organization comprised of many actors. These questions unravel a second 
controversy: can the FLN’s use of violence for emancipation ever be justified? As such, 
the controversies that emerge within the discourse often quarantine an investigation of 
French Algeria to a temporal period between 1954 and 1962. The effect of this endless 
controversy conceals French Algeria as a mode of settler colonialism. Further, as I argue 
in this chapter, French Algeria as a mode of settler colonialism persists in the 
contemporary moment as well as persists in concealing itself as a mode of settler 
colonialism.  
 I turn, then, to what can be traced as the biopolitical logics of captivity that 
defined French Algeria’s pernicious mode of settler colonialism. I argue in this chapter 
that French settler colonialism, especially as it unfolded within Algeria, both enforced 
and concealed itself through the logics of detainment, interrogation, and torture. 
Furthermore, detainment, interrogation, and torture are bound up in an economy of 
knowledge production that can be implicated within a politics of wounds. As such, this 
chapter is devoted to the politics of wounds in terms of these biopolitical logics of 
detainment, interrogation, and torture. Indeed, captivity falls within the (bio)politics of 
wounds insofar as it was detained Muslim, Arab, Berber, and colonized bodies that were 
injured, hurt, and wounded to not only extract knowledge about the FLN but to produce a 
body of knowledge about both the Muslim body and body politic. Furthermore, the 
staging of torture within interrogation centres concealed from view these processes of 
knowledge production.  
 Indeed, while France once fanned the flames of its own War on Terror in Algeria, 
a certain torch of knowledge concerning Muslim bodies has been passed to the imperial 
successor that is the United States of America. To be sure, the American military 
complex has mined French Algeria’s tactics of subordination as seen in French Algeria as 
well as Indochina for tips and tricks in detaining and extracting information from the 
contemporary insubordinate Muslim body. Hence, the erection of the Guantanamo Bay 
detention center, a prison camp assembled of thousands of torture cells, rests comfortably 
on the margins of the textual and visual fields and in addition the Abu Ghraib detention 
facility, where thousands more photos of the torture and humiliation of the Muslim body 
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is held captive within an inaccessible archive. 
 Much like their French predecessors, the American system of justice—bound to 
the ideals of humanism—struggles within the controversy of Guantanamo and Abu 
Ghraib to justify the use of torture, whether in the name of the war on terror or otherwise. 
In other words, these scenes of captivity pose, in Agamben’s words, the juridical question 
of the “the significance of a sphere of action that is in itself extra-juridical.”109 The 
controversy ultimately rests in the problem of the law coinciding with the norm 
(humanism, justice, or the civilizing and democratizing mission) as well as exceeding the 
norm (detention and torture). As such, the law and jurisprudence scavenge the corpse of 
liberal-humanism for legal means to justify or to extend the reach of torture a little closer 
towards the normal reach of the law. Hence, for the French Algerian police force, who 
turned into a paramilitary force, torture supposedly saved lives. And hence, President 
Bush and his administration would echo his predecessors, affirming the importance of the 
critical intelligence uncovered from “enhanced interrogation.”110 
 In brief, then, this chapter attempts to read through this endless controversy of 
Algeria, which always already conceals the settler-colonial reality and which has seeped 
into present day discourses around Israel and Palestine or America as well as 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, but not with an intent to rehash old arguments on terrorism, 
revolutionary or otherwise. Instead, I wish to think through French Algeria as a mode of 
settler colonialism, which shares certain historical and discursive continuities with 
contemporary settler-colonial projects. To be sure, I am not seeking to uncover a 
universal nature about settler colonialism. As a structure (and not an event), its machinery 
and assemblages continue to shapeshift and morph. Nevertheless, I hope that, in 
describing the biopolitical logics behind French Algeria’s mode of settler colonialism, I 
can not only draw attention to how settler colonialism is ultimately a project that hurts, 
that wounds, and that injures, but the ways in which settler colonialism is a project that 
works tirelessly to conceal its practices of maiming. 
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3.2 The Failure of French Algeria: a Brief History of 
French Settler Colonialism  
In the sweltering month of June 1830, France landed on the shores of Algeria, bearing the 
gunpowder and brawn of 37,000 soldiers. In less than two weeks, the French defeated the 
Ottoman empires, and declared Algeria an extension of its national body. Along with the 
acquisition of Morocco and Tunisia, France believed that it had earned its rightful place 
as a colonial superpower. However, France’s claim to Algerian soil did not go without 
controversy—both at home and abroad, foreshadowing the next 130 years of tenuous 
rule. The next decade in Algeria would unleash a series of Islamic revolts and the general 
dismay within the National Assembly as to why the empire was exhausting military 
resources where dysentery and the fear of Muslim uprisings broke troop confidence. 
Nevertheless, by 1850 both the right- and left-wing of the government arrived at the 
agreement that the colonization of Algeria would ultimately benefit France in addition to 
the colonized. After all, Algeria’s vast stretches of fertile land, expanding over 7.7 
million hectares, offered prime agricultural opportunities in the production of cash crops 
such as wine, cork, and alfalfa. Into the twentieth century, the colons had absorbed the 
majority of arable land, transforming Algeria into a vital economic powerhouse in 
France’s empire.111  
 Before the war for independence that would dismember Algeria from “French 
Algeria,” the population of European settlers had grown to nearly a million while the 
population of predominantly Arab and Berber descent grew to about 10 million.112 
However, that was 10 million voices that were denied French citizenship along with 
adequate political representation, education, and social welfare. Indeed, the settler 
colonial government controlled the Indigenous population under the Code de l’Indigénat, 
denying them the same privileges as the European colonizers.113 As the First World War 
approached, the government funneled all resources towards supporting the war effort, 
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leaving the Indigenous populations to the clutches of famine and poverty. By the Second 
World War, as Indigenous Algerians migrated into the urban centres, the cities 
transformed into segregated metropolises, separating the colons from the colonized, the 
settlers from the Indigenous, the French from the Arabs. As Fanon puts it, “The colonist’s 
sector is a white folks’ sector, a sector of foreigners. The colonized’s sector, or at least 
the “native” quarters, the shanty town, the Medina, the reservation […] is a famished 
sector.”114 Yet, in the cafes, the shops, and the bakeries of the colonized sector, a 
nationalist fervour brewed, exploding quite literally by 1956 into the settler’s quarters. 
 Despite the eventual transition into an independent or postcolonial nation, I name 
French Algeria as a mode of settler colonialism. French Algeria, to be sure, was not 
unlike contemporary forms of settler colonialism such as Canada and the United States. 
These two settler states are scarcely afraid to deploy punitive and military force to curb 
what are perceived as national security threats. For example, during Canada’s “Oka 
Crisis” between July 11 and September 26, 1990, Canada declared a state of emergency 
to justify the use of its military against the Mohawk community who resisted the 
construction of a golf course on their land.115 Recently, in United States during the early 
months of 2016, the Lakota opposed the Iowa government’s plan to build an oil pipeline 
through their water source. The state responded with a police force equipped with 
military-grade gear and water cannons.116 Indeed, France utilized every military trick in 
the book—a book which perhaps France penned—in an attempt to quell the growing 
rebellion in Algeria, including massacre, torture, and bombs.117 The settler’s control of 
Algeria, however, eventually imploded beneath the nationalistic pressure of the FLN, 
which flourished throughout the Indigenous communities of Algeria.  
 While Canada recently celebrated 150 years of settler colonialism, it might at first 
appear difficult to categorize French Algeria as a mode of settler colonialism, considering 
it decolonized, expelling the majority of Europeans from its territory. As well, settler-
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colonial scholarship traditionally investigates settler colonialism as an enduring and 
present structure. While French Algeria no longer exists as an obvious present structure, I 
will show that its structure persists as a present-past. Further, merely focusing on the 
event of decolonization writes French Algeria as an event belonging to the progression of 
history—a beloved narrative trick of settler colonial continuity—rather than recognizing 
French Algeria as belonging to a long-sustained and continuing structure of settler-
coloniality, albeit not always in immediately recognizable forms. 
 The settlers of Algeria invested quite the emotional and historical attachment to 
Algeria. Though they considered themselves French first and foremost, they developed 
an identity rooted in the blue coasts and red hills of Algeria, calling themselves the pied-
noirs or the black feet.118 Upon integration into France after the war for independence, 
the pied-noirs considered themselves the “guardians” of French Algerian memory, 
preserving a mythology that “by their sweat and blood, and through their superior 
technology, [they] succeeded in transforming the arid desert into fertile land.”119 
However, as Evans notes, this mythology was hardly accurate. The majority of settlers 
lived in the coastal cities, enjoying a comfortable lifestyle as white-collar workers, small-
trades people, and government officials.120 And they hardly established a demographic 
majority, which required them to rely on the resources of the French government and 
military for the maintenance of French Algeria, especially during the war. Of course, 
when France agreed to a cease fire with the FLN, the pied-noirs felt betrayed by their 
government as they were condemned to choose, from their perspective, either “the coffin 
or the suitcase.” 
 French Algeria’s geographic proximity to the burgeoning Cold War between 
NATO and the Soviet Union did not lend itself well to support from the international 
community. Allies, including America and Britain, were concerned that France’s 
continued oppression of the Algerian people would push them towards communism as a 
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solution to unchecked Western imperialism. Ironically, the United States was, at times, 
France’s most outspoken opponent. For example, the young senator John F. Kennedy, on 
the floor of the senate, aired his concerns about France’s continued imperial mission, 
declaring that “the present policy of the French Government in Algeria is bankrupt.”121 
For Kennedy, Western imperialism sanctioned the growth of Soviet imperialism—as 
such, much more was at stake in the battle of Algeria than political independence. In 
addition, Africa was undergoing a wave of decolonization post-World War Two, in 
which France had already surrendered Morocco and Tunisia. From the Indochina War, 
France had also lost Vietnam. As such, the quills on France’s back raised at the thought 
that it would lose Algeria too.  
 The overall instability of the French government after World War Two had also 
destabilized the political spectrum and snuffed out any confidence in the government’s 
ability to maintain a colony. During the war for independence, France exhausted three 
governments and weathered a military coup. With the fall of the authoritarianism and 
anti-Semitism of the Vichy regime in 1942, France’s Fourth Republic emerged. However, 
it was short-lived. A few years into the war for independence, France hailed the fall of the 
Fourth Republic and the emergence of the populist military hero, General de Gaulle in 
1958 after the closure of the government for three months.122 Although de Gaulle 
promised to find an equitable solution to the quickly expanding Algerian problem, de 
Gaulle realized the political and economic necessity of granting Algeria its independence. 
Unhappy with de Gaulle’s apparent betrayal of the pied-noirs and relinquishing of the 
civilizing mission, a small section of the military attempted to take control of Algeria and 
then France, fracturing the relationship between the metropole and the colony, which 
further weakened “the French cause from the inside.”123 Formally known as the “week of 
the barricades,” the attempted military coup did not last long, and de Gaulle committed to 
negotiating a ceasefire with the FLN.  
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 For as much as political strife and the international community fatigued French 
Algeria, it was ultimately because French Algeria could not endure the indigeneity of the 
people it colonized that it failed as a settler colony. To quote the freedom fighter, Zohra 
Drif, “settler colonialism […] brought with it a massive presence of Europeans whose 
looks toward us were at best condescending and at worst downright contemptuous. 
Through my hard work and success, every day I refuted their prejudices.”124 Following 
the work of Indigenous scholar J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, while settler colonialism builds 
itself upon the supposed elimination of Indigenous peoples—as bodies and as embodied 
practice—settler colonialism fails to accomplish the erasure of the indigeneity of the 
colonized. In other words, indigeneity does not endure settler colonialism but settler 
colonialism endures indigeneity and its commitment to active refusals to settler 
prejudices.125 The Algerians refused the civilizing mission, rejected French nationalism, 
and resisted the slow violence of French colonial rule. As such on March 19, 1962, 
Algeria achieved its independence.  
3.3 The Logic of Elimination: French Algeria as a 
Mode of Settler Colonialism 
French Algeria is not readily regarded as a mode of settler colonialism—if only because 
it is not necessarily a present material structure. Scholars of French history and society 
have noted that settler colonial studies have typically neglected French Algeria as an 
exemplary case study. Fiona Barclay, Charlotte Ann Chopin, and Evans assert that “the 
bloody dénouement of French Algeria, where structures of settler colonial domination 
were ultimately disrupted by the uprising of Algerian nationalists and the departure of the 
European population, may not, moreover, offer a salutary example to politically engaged 
scholars who seek to resolve the tensions of present-day settler colonial situations.”126 As 
such, my reading of French Algeria may seem to be an anachronistic exercise. However, 
I do not to wish to think of this reading as entirely retrospective. Instead, situating French 
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Algeria as a mode of settler colonialism—one that did not survive the enduring 
indigeneity of the Algerian people and one that persists as a present-past—creates a 
dialogue that disrupts settler continuity. Indeed, positing French Algeria as simply the 
past rather than a present-past commits to the settler narrative of “the dustbins of 
history,” linear temporality, and master narratives of progression.127 The French settler 
structures left behind in Algeria after formal decolonization persist, and France, like any 
settler state, has invested into projects of national memory making that erase their history 
of settler colonialism as well as building a bordered, national continuity.128 The textuality 
of French Algeria’s settler colonialism continues to grow as more and more memoirs, 
narratives, and accounts are published and translated into English. Furthermore, positing 
French Algeria as a present-past contributes to the ongoing conversation in settler 
colonial studies that settler colonialism is a persistent structure and not an event. This can 
be seen in Patrick Wolfe’s contribution to the settler colonial turn in the humanities and 
social sciences: the observation that the invasion and elimination of the Indigenous 
population by Europeans is a structure and not an event, taking a wide array of forms. As 
Wolfe writes:  
The logic of elimination can include ofﬁcially encouraged miscegenation, 
the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual freeholds, native 
citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total 
institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of 
cognate biocultural assimilations. All these strategies, including frontier 
homicide, are characteristic of settler colonialism.129  
In other words, settler colonialism constitutes an ongoing structure of slow violence that 
erodes, erases, and eliminates both Indigenous cultures and bodies through a variety of 
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settler tactics and technologies.130 It is not always an easily recognizable nor 
documentable genocide.  
 Wolfe’s identification of this “logic of elimination” comes from the necessity to 
think through settler colonialism outside the conceptual framework of genocide, which 
dominated the questions that arose with regard to settler colonialism’s eliminatory 
practice. While settler colonialism engenders genocide, genocide and settler colonialism 
require theoretical distinction. As such, Wolfe works to uncover a logic of elimination 
embedded within settler colonialism that, on the one hand may manifest as genocide but, 
on the other manifests other forms of elimination. Indeed, in the purview of history, 
genocide as a conceptual framework is too often encumbered by the exceptional status of 
the Holocaust—a catastrophic event read over and over again with little recourse to the 
settler colonial structures that engendered its possibility. In other words, scholarship on 
the Holocaust sometimes elides the recognizability of elimination in other forms as well 
as the logic of the camp that finds its blueprints within settler colonialism. Critical black 
feminist Alexander Weheliye asserts, “A thick historical relation defines the rise of 
modern concentration camps in colonial contexts and their subsequent reconstitution as 
industrialized killing machines in Europe.”131 For Wolfe, however, the relationship 
between genocide and settler colonialism cannot be merely defined as historical. That is, 
settler colonialism is not the precursor to the Holocaust, let alone genocide.132 Instead, 
genocide, elimination, and the biopolitics of the camp are immanent to the structure of 
settler colonialism itself, manifesting in a variety of forms.   
 The establishment of French Algerian as a settler colonial government relied on a 
logic of elimination. As such, I wish to think through the settler colonialism of French 
Algeria as an enduring structure and not an historical event, despite the eventual 
decolonization of French Algeria in 1962. As referenced earlier, the metropole denied 
Indigenous communities’ access to citizenship, rendering these communities in the eyes 
of the state as merely subjects of French empire. This classification through legal 
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structures alienated Indigenous Algerians from the rights of man that the French held 
dear in their civilizational identity. However, in contradiction, the colonial government 
operated on the assumption of assimilating the Arab and Berber majority demographic 
into this French system of values through the “civilizing mission.” Fraught with 
contradictions, the civilizing mission of French empire—and colonialism more broadly—
which was established through education, the church, law, punitive measures, and 
medicine, ambivalently worked to humanize the colonized while simultaneously 
rendering them as not wholly human.133 Disguised as emancipation, the civilizing 
mission in fact eliminated the possibility of accessing the universal rights afforded by 
humanism by virtue of being rendered as not wholly human.  
 In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon attends to how this process of elimination 
works in competing directions to “amputate” the colonized subject from his or her being 
in the world as a fully present human. In this sense, the civilizing mission attempts to 
eliminate an Indigenous person’s connections to her knowledge systems as well as her 
access to the privileges and/or full-humanity of whiteness. Elimination engenders the 
status of neither/nor that is felt as solely negating. Fanon writes, “Without a black past, 
without a black future, it was impossible for me to live my blackness. Not yet white, no 
longer completely black, I was damned.”134 For Fanon, the existence of the colonized is 
barraged by a series of negations, of nots. To “civilize” Indigenous communities, the 
colonizer attempts to eliminate their indigeneity. To justify their mission, the colonizer 
negates their full humanity, abandoning the colonized into what Fanon calls a perpetual 
zone of non-being.135 To put it another way, the civilizing missions eliminates the onto-
epistemological possibilities of the colonized.  
 As Indigenous scholars have observed, settler colonialism accomplishes this 
double amputation most effectively through the displacement of Indigenous communities 
from their land, which often bears their history, knowledge, and identity. Leanne 
Simpson and Audra Simpson have argued that land is a fundamental source for 
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Indigenous onto-epistemological projects.136 Indeed, France’s settler colonial fantasies 
imagined an Algeria without Algerians. To realize this fantasy, France turned to the 
strategies of the Ottoman empire and other colonial encounters to resolve the problem of 
the enduring Indigenous populations. Avoiding outright extermination, France found it 
felicitous to expel Algerians into neighbouring countries or to forcefully migrate them 
into the Sahara Desert where they would be thought to perish. However, this posed the 
material problem of labour—or, who would then build the colony? 137 For the French 
then, Indigenous Algerians were quarantined to “native quarters” in the cities such as 
Algiers or restricted to the bled (countryside) to work the land, fueling the French 
economy and war efforts. Regardless, mass resettlement of Indigenous Algerians from 
their homeland to cities as well as unhospitable land was a common tactic utilized by the 
settler colonial government to secure settler dominancy.138  
 Through mass displacement, the French government removed Indigenous 
Algerians from their history—however, France continues to foreclose if not eliminate 
Algeria’s connection to its own history. The settler colonial government, of course, kept 
good records of the land and the people it dominated. While controversy in scholarship 
continues to stir over official numbers of Indigenous Algerians killed during France’s 
occupation, France actively withholds this information. In the conclusion of her memoir, 
Drif draws attention to how she cannot access the archives of Algeria because they are 
geographically located in France and confined within bureaucratic walls: 
I hope that with all my heart that our universities and architecture schools 
will one day teach the truth, the whole truth, about the willful erasure and 
perversion of our cultural and historical heritage. Only a perfect 
knowledge of those 132 long years of cultural genocide can prevent its 
reoccurrence. The archives exist, though they are in France. This is 
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another battle to wage: reclaiming our archives to fill the gaps in our 
collective memory, which was severely pillaged, so that we can rebuild 
ourselves.139 
In other words, the struggle for decolonization—that of knowledge systems and 
collective memory—is hardly over. Indeed, there persists a settler colonial structure 
between Algeria and France, where history, knowledge, and memory is held in captivity.  
 Seeking a nuanced definition of settler colonialism, Lorenzo Veracini further 
distinguishes it from colonialism. Veracini offers three additional criteria that can be 
applied to French Algeria as a mode of settler colonialism. Using the metaphors of 
bacterial and viral infections, Veracini distinguishes colonialism, along with imperialism 
and empire, as an enterprise that utilizes its host’s wealth and labour for its own 
reproduction like a virus.140 For example, France’s earlier colony, Santo Dominigo, 
functioned to produce wealth for the growing colonial economy through the exploitation 
of predominantly slave labour. Of course, San Domingo underwent its own revolution 
and eventual war for independence under the tutelage of the ex-slave Toussaint 
Louverture while both Anglo and Franco interests waged diplomatic battles over the fate 
of Santo Domingo. 141 Settler colonialism, however, constitutes settler collectives that 
“make and remake places and are simultaneously transformed by them.”142 Unlike Santo 
Dominigo, then, French Algeria’s long tenure radically reshaped Algerian land, social 
structures, and peoples. Indeed, the most prominent settler colonial collective that 
emerged in French Algeria was the pied-noirs who believed themselves to be a distinct 
people who were both French and Algerian. Echoing Evans description of the pied-noirs 
earlier, this settler collective as pioneers of the Algerian frontier believed themselves to 
be molded by the land they terraformed.143 In addition, this settler collective persists 
today as an identity rooted in memory and history.  
 This settler collective is Veracini’s first criterion, which informs the second: 
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settler colonial experience. With the formation of the pied-noirs as a distinct group came 
the naturalization of the “right to belong,”144 displacing this right to belong from both 
Indigenous Algerians—who were removed from their land—and other migrants who 
would call Algeria home. During the Vichy Regime, for example, French Algeria 
revoked the right to citizenship from all communities that were not French, such as the 
Jewish and Spanish communities. These policies instilled a demarcatable settler colonial 
collective of, on the one hand, desirable co-ethnics and assimilable indigenes, and on the 
other hand, undesirable exogenous others and unassimilable Indigenous others.145 This 
road map leads to Veracini’s third criterion: that settler colonialism is a form of 
biopolitical control, a feature which is formative to understanding the (bio)politics of 
wounds.  
3.4 Make Live and Make Die: Biopolitics in the Settler 
Colonial Context 
In 2003, Achille Mbembe published an immensely influential article titled 
“Necropolitics,” which interjected a radically powerful reading of death and the 
formation of sovereignty into the ongoing conversation on biopolitics as it pertains to the 
(post)colonial situation. Perhaps Mbembe opened up the possibility in theoretical 
scholarship to think through biopolitics outside the immediate purview of Agamben and 
Foucault—especially in the context of the European colonial legacy. Indeed, Mbembe 
has been cited frequently in new radical theorizations of biopolitics. As such, I have 
chosen an array of thinkers that not only offer important contributions to biopolitics in the 
context of settler colonialism, and to an extent racialization, but can be traced back to 
Mbembe’s necropolitics in some way. That is not to suggest that these thinkers are 
derivative of necropolitics, but that they share a theoretical affiliation and commitment 
with Mbembe. In addition, these thinkers—Alexander Weheliye, Sherene Razack, and 
Jasbir Puar—highlight a very crucial fact of biopolitics: that there persists multiple 
“vectors” of control, management, and extermination that the settler colony has at its 
disposal to control and manage its body politic. In this chapter, I am specifically 
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concerned with questions of the right to maim—or, the right to wound, injure, and 
debilitate other bodies as a vector of biopower.  
 Before I proceed with an unpacking of Mbembe’s necropolitics, it is fruitful to 
begin with a brief overview of Agamben’s and Foucault’s contribution to biopolitics. To 
be sure, their respective projects are large, and it is not my aim here to trace every nuance 
of their work. Indeed, Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics, published posthumously, are still 
hotly debated, and Agamben’s homo sacer project is ongoing with over a dozen volumes. 
For our purposes here, it is important to attend to Agamben’s “bare life” and “bios” as 
well as Foucault’s formulation of “make life” and “let die” as they are taken up in a 
variety of ways in the critical literature to follow. One more consideration can be made 
between these two thinkers: biopolitics describes more than just the management and 
control of bodies as one-dimensional surfaces. In other words, as I elucidate later, the 
biopower of the sovereign extends its reach across multiple surfaces, including the 
infrastructural, bodily, and psycho-existential. Moreover, biopolitics describes what 
bodies are brought into the body politic (polis) and what bodies are excluded, which is an 
important consideration within the context of settler colonialism.146   
 Often, scholars trace the birth of Agamben’s biopolitics through his ground-
breaking work in the “home sacer trilogy,” where Agamben theorizes how the law and 
the sovereign emerge in the political order. For Agamben, modern sovereignty depends 
on generating the ideal political body. Agamben writes, “It can even be said that the 
production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power […] placing 
biological life at the centre of its calculations.”147 This production of the ideal body 
requires the division of life into two distinct categories: bios and zoe. Bios depicts a body 
with political capacity. Zoe depicts a life (or body) outside the purview of politics, and 
hence becomes ascribed as “bare life.” Bare life becomes that which is outside politics, 
and as such that which is outside the law; however, it is not outside the power and 
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violence of the sovereign. As the infamous adage goes, bare life is life that can be killed 
but not sacrificed. This relationship engenders, for Agamben, the concentration camp, the 
reservation, the interrogation centre, or the “native” quarters. These spaces create zones 
of exception insofar as the sovereign, who creates the law, can act outside the law in 
these zones. The most important theoretical point for Agamben here is that the law, 
paradoxically, sources its force or legitimacy through the exception. Only by producing 
and maintaining zones of exception is the “force” of the law possible.  
 For Foucault, biopolitics also describes the emergence of sovereign power. 
Although Foucault also arrives at his framework through a reading of Aristotle’s bios and 
zoe, Foucault nuances his vision in a different way.148 Bios, or life, in Foucault’s 
rendition becomes subsumed into the political order of things where sovereign power acts 
on it. This power is focalized through the formula of “make live and let die.” As 
Weheliye expertly puts it, “this is the moment in which politics takes hold of the 
biological and the biological health of the national population defines the exercise of state 
power” over the life and mortality of its citizens.149 It is within the institutions of care, of 
bureaucracy of public management, and the interrogation centre that the sovereign can 
execute its power through the vector of make life and let die—in other words, 
populations can be managed in such a way that some are allowed to live and some are 
excluded to perish. Foucault renders, then, a similar concept of the exception and 
exceptionalism that Agamben does with the camps, which Puar encapsulates, I think, 
rather poetically: “the interplay between exception and exceptionalism [is where] the 
deferred death of one population recedes as the securitization and valorization of the life 
over another population triumphs in its shadow.”150 Despite critical contribution to the 
understanding of the paradigm of sovereignty within modernity, Foucault’s and 
Agamben’s theoretical work neglects the specificities of sovereign power in the colonial 
contexts. What does the politicization of life look like in the colony?  
 Mbembe finds the previous descriptions of biopolitics that emphasize the 
sovereign’s autonomy at the expense of interrogating those iterations of sovereignty, such 
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as those found in the colonies that instrumentalised the exploitation and destruction of 
populations, to be problematic. As such, Mbembe recalibrates Foucault’s formula from 
“make live and let die” to “who may live and who must die” in order to account for the 
sovereign power as it exists in the (post)colony.151 More than just the politicization of 
life, the sovereign often wields the power to make death through the vectors of 
calculation, instrumentalization, and extraction (which sum up to be additional 
manifestations of Wolfe’s the logic of elimination). To quote Mbembe: 
My concern is those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the 
struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human 
existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations. 
Such figures of sovereignty are far from a piece of prodigious insanity or 
an expression of a rupture between the impulses and interests of the body 
and those of the mind. Indeed, they, like the death camps, are what 
constitute the nomos of the political space in which we still live. 
Furthermore, contemporary experiences of human destruction suggest that 
it is possible to develop a reading of politics, sovereignty, and the subject 
different from the one we inherited from the philosophical discourse of 
modernity. Instead of considering reason as the truth of the subject, we can 
look to other foundational categories that are less abstract and more tactile, 
such as life and death.152  
Already, Mbembe anticipates reading against or at least outside the inherited onto-
epistemological project of the Enlightenment, whose knowledge production often cloaks 
“contemporary experiences” in abstract, philosophical language by either minoritizing or 
relegating to the margins of “valid” knowledge production voices outside the 
Enlightenment tradition. To echo Thobani’s wisdom from chapter one, this political-
philosophical project performs a kind of violence in its failure to engage with or discuss, 
as Mbembe points out, these contemporary experiences. 
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 In other words, for Mbembe, the challenge becomes to rethink biopolitics in the 
embattled zones of the colony—and by extension the settler state—which has been 
typically neglected by the biopolitical frames that privilege the absolute audacity and 
historical certainty that is modernity’s Holocaust. Biopolitics, particularly the Agambian 
interpretation, is wrapped up in this “exceptional signifier” that is the Holocaust, 
obscuring the possibility of theorizing or recognizing other historical and contemporary 
moments of destruction and instrumentalization of human bodies (such as with settler 
colonialism) if only because the Holocaust is always evoked to describe the autonomy of 
the sovereign at its worst and as if the worst did not emerge before the Holocaust and 
continue in some capacity.153 In other words, Mbembe’s “necropolitics” thinks through 
and against this theoretical elision by returning the conversation back to the concepts of 
life and death outside what has been mischaracterized by Euro-American political and 
philosophical history as the  “exceptional” that was the Nazi concentration (or death) 
camps. Reiterating Weheliye’s critique of genocide and its economy of knowledge: 
“concentration camps shared an intimate history with different forms of colonialism and 
genocide before being transformed into the death camps of Nazi Germany.”154 As such, 
for Mbembe, the political-philosophical knowledge production of Euro-American 
biopolitics, and theory at large, has committed itself to an “ailment of memory” and 
contemporary blind spots to the legacy of colonial instrumentalization and destruction of 
human bodies.155 However, this is not all to suggest that scholars, activists, and artists 
have not been doing this critical work of excavating these histories. As Weheliye 
shrewdly, and somewhat sarcastically, points out, critical race theorists and writers have 
been writing about bare life, the camp, and state of exception long before Foucault and 
Agamben: 
The [biopolitics] of Foucault and Agamben are deemed transposable to a 
variety of spatiotemporal contexts because the authors do not speak from 
an explicitly racialized view point (in contradistinction to non-white 
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scholars […]), which lends their credibility and, once against displaces 
minority discourses. If I didn’t know any better, I would suppose that 
scholars not working in minority discourses seem thrilled they no longer 
have to consult the scholarship of non-white thinkers now that European 
master subjects have deigned to weigh in on these topics.156  
 Yet, I take Pauline Wakeham’s point that in rendering the sovereign’s vectors of 
control against Indigenous communities in terms of exclusively death—or rendering them 
as death making—commits to the theoretical attitude that Indigenous communities are 
always already erased or erasable.157 What does enduring indigeneity look like within 
biopolitical frameworks? As such, Mbembe’s necropolitics risks naturalizing death as the 
ultimate condition or outcome of colonial biopolitical projects. That is, they risk 
naturalizing the logic that Indigenous communities endure colonialism when, in fact, the 
opposite is true. Indeed, this is an important nuance to think through because settler 
colonial biopolitical logics, following Wolfe and Scott Morgenson, even if eliminatory, 
function to (re)produce Indigenous bodies as part of the settler colonial body politic.158 
Settler colonial vectors of control, then, are often cloaked as progressive, natural, and fail 
to appear as extraordinarily violent. Hence, settler colonial vectors of control might be 
more accurately described as a form of slow violence that debilitates, injures, and wounds 
over time.  
3.5 The Right to Maim: Coloniality, Biopower, and 
Violence  
If the biopolitical logics of settler colonialism are not exclusively death-making, then in 
what other ways can we frame these vectors of control? To be sure, they are still 
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eliminatory. Nevertheless, I name settler colonialism’s vectors of biopower and violence 
together as coloniality. In the settler and post- colonial contexts, I think it is necessary to 
read violence and biopower together but as separate vectors of control that, I argue, 
converge through the vector of coloniality. I derive this concept of coloniality from 
Mbembe’s seminal English text, On the Postcolony where Mbembe uncovers the 
founding violence of the colony that cements the biopower inherent to the settler’s right 
to rule. From there, I attend to Jasbir Puar’s concept of the settler colony’s right to 
maim—synonymous with injury, wounds, and vulnerability—which Puar identifies as the 
distinguishing biopolitical feature of settler colonial rule. Indeed, I read the right to maim 
(biopower) and the right to rule (founding violence) together as the condition of 
possibility for settler colonialism termed here as its coloniality. I find that coloniality 
operates through the camouflage of humanitarianism to conceal its vectors of biopower 
and violence, which is a violence unto itself.  
 Before his widely influential article on necropolitics, Mbembe began thinking 
through the sovereignty of the colonial archetype in terms of commandement. “The 
colonial enterprise,” writes Mbembe, “was, first, the assertion of a right (not negotiated 
but simply arrogated) over persons and things […] In this regard, such sovereignty rather 
resembles the supposed “state of nature,” allowing itself to do whatever it wishes. It can 
possess, make use of, and enjoy whatever it pleases since it alone is competent to judge 
what is good and truly useful to itself, and since there is no abuse in whatever it may do 
against the native. In this sense, it exercises an absolute dominion over the native.”159 
Mbembe names this state of nature or right as commandement wherein the land, the 
Indigenous, and other life forms serve as the “raw materials” for the settler colony’s 
sovereignty. In other words, the sovereign derives its right to rule (and later right to 
maim) from the denigration of the land and bodies it occupies. Indeed, commandement 
outlines the formulation of “make life” and “make death” that describes necropolitics. 
For my purposes, however, I am interested in the moment or moments of the assertion of 
a right a priori. That is, a right to hurt, injure, scold, and wound persons derived through 
the very act of injuring.  
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 Commandement describes two concrete things for Mbembe. On the one hand, it 
describes the foundational violence of colonialism that authorizes its unfettered right to 
rule. To put it another way, much like Agamben’s identification of the paradox of 
sovereignty establishing law outside the force of the law, the sovereignty of (settler) 
colonialism founds its right to rule within a zone of exception. This zone emerges 
between the frontier and the colonizer where political-philosophical knowledge renders 
the land in terms of terra nullius, justifying the right to occupation. Further, and to put it 
another way, the imagined risk of the land always returning to the “dark ages,” that is, a 
land void of law and knowledge, if the European colonizer abandoned its manifest 
destiny, legitimizes “the right” to a host of verbs to maintain control of the land and its 
inhabitants.160 Hence, the encroachment of civilization into the “frontier” by whatever 
means is justified as it illuminates against the opposing dark ages that have, in the settler 
colonial narrative, swallowed the land. And hence, colonial expeditions are always 
already exempt from their own values of civilization. As Mbembe writes, 
“Commandement scarcely raised questions of its ends; it was the very instance that 
justified them.”161 From the outset, then, colonialism was a regime d’exception, rendering 
the colony as one, seemingly endless zone of exception to the rule of law and of the 
politicization of life and its capacities.  
 This logic beckons Mbembe’s second point: commandement produces the 
conquerable, punishable, and contingent category of “the native” (or Indigenous). For the 
colonizers, the Indigenous body was a canvas for violence legitimized through the 
boundaries of captivity such as the labour camp, the interrogation centre, and the 
jailhouse. Mbembe writes, “whatever the forms and quality of the penal rituals, they 
shared the feature of doing something to the body of the colonized. […] he/she was in 
effect marked, broken in, compelled to provide forced labor, obliged to attend 
ceremonies, the aim being not only to tame and bring him/her to heel but also to extract 
from him/her the maximum possible use.”162 Nevertheless, the category of unassimilable 
Indigenous others, to borrow Veracini’s terms, founds the scaffolding for the settler 
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state’s biopower—the surface or body in which the state can establish itself as the sole 
sovereign of the realm. However, for Mbembe, this exercise of biopower operates 
through “micro-actions,” occurring in “what might be called the details. It tended to erupt 
at any time, on whatever pretext and anywhere.”163 Indeed, these thousand small details 
inflicted over bodies in captivity, bodies under interrogation, or bodies excluded from the 
rights of the white hetero man percolated as a slow violence. Here, I borrow the parlance 
of Lauren Berlant: the collective living of the colonized, or more accurately Indigenous 
collectives, in the context of settler colonies became the scenes “of administration, 
discipline, and recalibration”—or, in other words, the scenes of captivity.164 
Commandement, as a regime of (slow) biopower and violence, makes and enforces life, 
rather than makes death insofar as the colony requires the life of these Indigenous 
collectives as its source of sovereignty. Its violence and biopower—as the vectors of 
coloniality—are slow because they merely inflict nicks and bruise as well as administer 
toxins and poisons over time that have been naturalized by coloniality as fundamental 
properties of the unassimilable Indigenous others. They are unassimilable, or they cannot 
be saved because they are fundamentally wounded. Meanwhile, the settler colony regards 
itself as the curator of the cure, the institution of care, and the only thinkable bastion of 
civilizational progress. Its biopower and violence, in other words, are regarded as 
humanitarian.  
 Indeed, the very right to injure or maim locates its raison d’être as the common 
good, civilizational progress, and humanitarianism. For Puar, the capacity of the settler to 
deliberately maim “triangulates the hierarchies of living and dying that are standardly 
deployed in theorizations of biopolitics.”165 Whereas the biopolitical formula commonly 
tends to suggest biopower operates on the logic of “make live” or “let die,” Puar rewrites 
the equation as “will not let die” and “will not make die.” In this way, Puar accounts for 
how coloniality conceals itself as humanitarian. The settler colonial state controls 
Indigenous collectives through debilitation, maiming, and injuring rather than exclusively 
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death-making. To be sure, the settler colony prefers to uphold its image as a progressive 
or utopian state, which is difficult to maintain if it openly discloses its logics of 
elimination. As such, maiming is a targeted and tactical endeavour with the intended 
purpose of either slowly removing a population or assimilating a population into the body 
politic.166  
 Debilitation and maiming of Indigenous populations is enacted through a variety 
of means that, through their slow process, naturalize their occurrence or geneticize their 
outcomes. On the one hand, debilitation includes the targeting of caloric intake, access to 
useable water, and access to appropriate long term medical care. It can also include 
inhibition of infrastructural development or the destruction of infrastructure. All in all, 
these tactics, more than reducing life to bare life, impose the question, for Puar, of how 
much can bare life bear?167 For example, in the context of French Algeria, the settler 
government restricted Indigenous Algerians’ access to nutrition and calories, inducing an 
epidemic of starvation and malnutrition.168 The broader medical institutions of colonial 
France as well, which I will touch on later in this chapter, neglected to properly care for 
the colonized, writing off most illness or diseases as the natural condition of the 
colonized, which was at times referred to as “North African Syndrome.” Finally, the 
benevolent bourgeoisie believed that paying below minimum wages was doing 
Indigenous employees a favour: it kept them steadily employed.169 Careful calculation 
links all these instances of maiming.  
 Sherene Razack offers a fruitful way of thinking through Puar’s “not let die” and 
“not make die” with the phrase, “dying from improvement.” While investigating 
Indigenous death within settler state custody, Razack poses an important question: how is 
it that Indigenous persons end up dying while under the care of the state?170 Settler 
colonialism since its origin has been a project of improvement—both of the land and 
Indigenous bodies. As such, dying in this case can be material—that is, the inevitable 
                                                 
166 Puar, The Right to Maim, 139. 
167 Puar, The Right to Maim, 139.  
168 Evans, Algeria Undeclared, 36-37.  
169 Ted Morgan, My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir. (New York: Harper Collins, 2005): 179.  
170 Sherene Razack, Dying From Improvement: Inquests and Inquiries into IndigenousDeaths in Custody. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015): 59.  
65 
 
elimination of Indigenous bodies in the name of improvement—or it can be metaphorical 
insofar as dying denotes the erasure and extinguishing of Indigenous culture and access 
to land. Improvement masks the dying. With French Algeria, of course, the French 
believed wholeheartedly that they were improving the land, improving the Indigenous 
peoples, and improving their own civilization through amassing wealth. All the while, 
Indigenous Algerians were debilitated, injured, and wounded by the institutions, 
technologies, and apparati of the settler state. The settler state has a habit of posing itself 
as caring about the Indigenous populations it works so hard to harm.  
 I find Razack’s formulation of dying from improvement to be synonymous with 
coloniality as it implies coloniality’s vectors of violence and biopower. Further, as 
Razack points out, the coloniality of dying from improvement works to conceal its 
operations: “settler colonialism […] produces settlers as caring, civilized, and modern, 
persons with the moral authority and knowledge to save Indigenous peoples.”171 While 
the settlers are committed to the task of saving the Indigenous in earnest—often through 
assimilation—settlers continue to injure Indigenous bodies as a mode of control. 
“Indigenous bodies,” writes Razack, “become violable as damaged bodies which can 
only be managed through force. It is possible to kick, punch, and drag Indigenous bodies 
without impunity.”172 All the force utilized against Indigenous bodies is in the name of 
improvement, but not necessarily the improvement of Indigenous bodies, land, and 
culture. As such, the coloniality is both the act of concealment and the act of kicking, 
punching, and dragging. Coloniality constructs the zone of exception through its 
founding violence, holding the unassimilable Indigenous other in captivity where it can 
then write injury over the body of this other.  
Razack contextualizes this formulation by interrogating the case of an Indigenous 
man, Paul Alphonse, who was wounded and eventually killed while in the custody of the 
Canadian RCMP. After resisting arrest, after resisting being held captive by the officer, a 
police officer marks Alphonse’s body with a boot print. Here, Alphonse’s body is 
narrativized as the frontier, that is, where the colonizer leaves his mark on the frontier in 
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the moment of founding violence. And yet, this act of police brutality hides itself. That is 
to say, bureaucracy, jurisprudence, and that claim that, ultimately, the RCMP is an 
institution of care holds the scene of Alphonse’s hurt captive. Indeed, Alphonse was held 
captive until the moment that beget his death. In this grueling story that Razack uncovers 
through an examination of court records, personal accounts, and shrewd observation, 
Razack not only reveals the vectors of biopower and violence concealed by settler 
colonial narratives of care but reveals the fundamental need of settler colonial punitive 
forces to detain, capture, withhold, and incarcerate Indigenous, black, and brown bodies. 
And it is in these spaces, which persist on the margins of everyday sight, where racialized 
and Indigenous bodies are injured and interrogated for the improvement of settler society. 
To be sure, the withholding of Alphonse and the kick to his abdomen was enacted in the 
name of preserving, protecting, and improving the broader settler colonial body politic.    
 In the context of French Algeria settler society, I find the same structure. During 
the climax of the war for independence, French Algerian police and military force, which 
eventually mutated into the para, deployed torture as the ultimate means of extracting 
information about the FLN and other “suspects.” Here, I argue that torture was indeed an 
extreme material rendering of coloniality. To be sure, torture within these interrogation 
centres utilized the right to maim or to not let their captives die until all information was 
extracted. As ex-French soldier Ted Morgan recounts the words of a torturer in his 
memoir on the battle of Algiers:  
We’re told we’re saving lives. It’s always done at night. A guy is brought 
in. We make him take his clothes off. Being naked is a terrible humiliation 
for an Arab. We have various methods. Pouring water down their throat 
with a funnel, or using a soldering iron on the soles of their feet, or a lit 
cigarette on a nipple. The gègne works best, with one of our boys turning 
the handles faster to turn up the juice. There’s no risk of 
electrocution.173_______________________________________ 
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Indeed, the conversation begins with the suggestion that torture, ultimately, saves lives. It 
ends with the humanitarian suggestion that it does not kill lives either. As such, torture is 
framed as the right to maim vectors of not let die and not make die.  
 Nevertheless, torture, as Dorothy Roberts asserts, served a specific political 
function to render bodies as subjectable, disposable, injurable, and inferior. 174 Roberts 
writes, “positioning racialized captives in total subjection makes the torture appear to be 
defending civilization, law, and order; the injured captive becomes the wrongdoer 
deserving of punishment.”175 Much like the detainment of Paul Alphonse and the police 
brutality he experienced, torture naturalizes the status of vulnerability and inferiority of 
the Indigenous body by wounding the body, debilitating the body, and scarring the body.  
3.6 Scenes of Captivity: Epidermalization and 
Knowledge Production 
Up until now I have seemingly delimited the category of the body, including in chapter 
one, as a vulnerable object that is perhaps distinct from the experience of vulnerability 
and resilience. Bodies sometimes emerge in this discourses of biopolitics, settler 
colonialism, and torture as single-dimensional surfaces where injury, hurt, or wounds are 
written across the body’s skin. In part, I think this is a limit engendered by the discourse 
of biopolitics generally where the body tends to stand in for life or bios. Here, I am 
inspired by Rene Dietrich’s centring of geos as the other half of bios that western 
political-philosophical knowledge production divorces from its field of inquiry. As 
Dietrich writes, “such a logic ultimately rests on a European tradition of thought (which 
is universalized in settler colonial contexts).”176 However, this final section is not 
interested in reading geos as the other half of bios. Rather, I use this disruption by 
Dietrich to simply decenter the body as the central object of knowledge within a 
biopolitical framework. In other words, biopolitics has yet to resolve, I think, the mind-
body split that has troubled feminist and Indigenous scholars and their critiques of the 
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Euro-American philosophical tradition. Indeed, Puar invites us to think through this 
question. “Through the practice of maiming, stunting, and debilitation,” writes Puar in 
the context of Israel’s occupation of Gaza, “Palestinians are further literalized and 
lateralized as surfaces, as bodies, without souls, as sheer biology, thus rendered as non-
human.”177 Euro-American political-philosophical knowledge production has both 
rendered the body as inherently vulnerable, abject, and injurable, as well as divorced it 
from “the mind” or experience. A body rendered in terms of sheer biology does not 
necessarily possess the capacity to experience. It is an animalized body, a dehumanized 
body, a body bound to zoological discourses, as Fanon would say.178  In this final section, 
then, I think through how the right to maim operates across multiple surfaces, including 
the experiential and the bodily. As such, I suggest that the right to maim not only 
debilitates bodily surfaces but also psycho-existential “surfaces.” 
 To accomplish this, I turn to Fanon who is not generally regarded as a thinker in 
the realm of the biopolitical. Nevertheless, I believe that Fanon offers quite a few insights 
into the everyday reach of coloniality’s vectors of control, biopower and violence. Of 
course, Fanon’s later works deeply concern themselves with revolutionary praxis. His 
earlier publications, however, offer a rich source of political commentary on race, settler 
colonialism, and political-philosophical knowledge production that seed his later work. 
Where Fanon has recently been resuscitated, so to speak, across a broad range of critical 
race and postcolonial conversations, Nigel Gibson importantly remarks, “why begin a 
contemporary engagement with Fanon assuming a priori the limits of his thought.”179 In 
part, Gibson is responding to a body of scholarship that quarantines Fanon to his time and 
place, producing Fanon as a controversial voice in two distinct ways. On the one hand, 
Fanon is sometimes mistaken as a sympathizer of terrorism, and that his philosophy of 
violence as an existential cleansing force is merely a dangerous means to an end.180 The 
debate continues, on the other hand, as to whether Fanon can be appropriately read and 
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“applied” outside his time and place.181 Though many scholars continue to argue that it is 
impossible to utilize Fanon to think through contemporary problems, many recognize, as 
Max Silverman notes, that “the power in [Fanon’s work] resides in its ability to travel 
across the frontiers of place, history, and politics and speak in different voices to different 
readers.”182 It is from this vantage point I wish to read Fanon, rejecting any a priori 
judgement of Fanon. Though I do not intend to read Fanon strictly as a thinker of the 
biopolitical, his critiques of racism and medical knowledge production with regard to 
“North African Syndrome” reveal how the right to maim in fact works across multiple 
surfaces. More importantly, as I am reading settler colonialism as a structure, the work of 
Fanon, which finds itself engaged within these settler colonial structures, becomes an 
invaluable tool in interrogating them.  
 Fanon’s political thinking emerged within the context of the settler colonial 
institution of care, the hospital. While Fanon is most well-known as a philosopher and 
revolutionary, he was in fact a trained medical doctor, graduating from Université de 
Lyon in 1952. Even though Fanon studied the medical sciences, he remained a voracious 
reader of literature and continental philosophy, studying the canonical works such as 
Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. In addition, he studied under the influential Négritud 
poet, Aimé Césaire, where Fanon developed his unique, poetic voice. His doctoral 
dissertation, which was originally rejected by the university as well as a variety of 
publishers, was eventually published as Black Skin, White Masks. Part psychoanalytic 
study, part black philosophy, and part poetry, Black Skin, White Masks continues to be 
one of the most influential works on black ontology, racism, and colonialism. In 1953, 
Fanon accepted a post at the Hôpital Psychiatrique de Blida-Joinville to practice 
psychiatry, which was situated within the town of Blida, Algeria. By treating the 
existential wounds of both French soldiers and Algerians, Fanon quickly developed his 
political praxis, recognizing the long-term impact colonialism had on the colonized’s 
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sense of self as object in the world.183 “Because it is a systemized negation of the other, a 
frenzied determination to deny the other any attribute of humanity,” writes Fanon, 
“colonialism forces the colonized to ask the question: ‘who am I in reality?’”184 For 
Fanon, coloniality was a diagnosable pathology. The corrective treatment, then, that 
Fanon pondered was a deeply political one.  
 In his first published essay, “The ‘North African Syndrome’,” Fanon addresses 
the pathology of coloniality, which offers a subtle critique of its vectors of biopower and 
violence. Describing the encounter between a racialized patient and a European doctor, 
Fanon illuminates how knowledge production commits to the elision of coloniality as the 
precursor for many of the colonized’s psychosomatic wounds that manifest seemingly 
without lesions, bruises, or scars. In turn, these wounds are interpreted by the Euro-
American ethnoepisteme as the simulations of a lying North African or Arab:  
In the face of this pain without lesion, this illness distributed in and over 
the whole body, this continuous suffering, the easiest attitude, to which 
one comes more or less rapidly, is the negation of any morbidity. When 
you come down to it, the North African is a simulator, a liar, a malingerer, 
a sluggard, a thief.185 
Here, in this encounter, the patient is reduced to sheer biology or a one-dimensional 
surface through the misdiagnosis of his or her abstract pain. Conventional medical 
discourse ordains, Fanon points out, that every symptom supposes its wound—or every 
symptom follows a mappable pathology.186 However, in finding no open wounds, 
bruises, or lesions on the body of the patient, the doctor diagnoses his or her condition as 
simply “North African Syndrome,” denying the colonial reality of hurt experienced by 
the patient. Either the patient is a fraud, feigning injury to get out of work, or his or her 
skin colour is the wound itself.  
 Two points become clear from this encounter. The first point is that the patient’s 
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experience of pain and suffering from bearing psychosomatic wounds is foreclosed—if 
only because the patient is reduced to sheer biology. Trauma and other psychosomatic 
wounds, which are products of coloniality, are refused in place of the racist 
categorizations of North Africans as lazy and lying, rather than as experiencing “pain” 
and “suffering” from the system itself. As Mazi Allen observes in his reading of the 
institutional culture Fanon was in dialogue with, “the racist construct of the ‘Arab’ in that 
cultural imaginary and the real, institutional, forces (precisely in the form of the state 
racism referred to by Foucault) […] combined to ‘break’ real North Africans into 
conforming to the […] stereotypes imposed upon them by the French.”187 This vector of 
biopower—named as breaking—maims the patient’s experience of his or her body in 
reality, inflicting (further) psychosomatic wounds, through the refusal of proper care and 
diagnosis of the patient’s ailment. By debilitating, wounding, and injuring the 
colonized—by breaking them into their stereotypes—the European doctor affirms the 
ethnoepisteme that arrives a priori to the diagnosis. The second point relates to the first, 
which I name as the racializing process of epidermalization, which, as a founding 
violence, founds this ethnoepisteme.  
 Epidermalization refers to the phenomena where the white gaze—or more 
broadly, Euro-American knowledge production—assembles the flesh of the other in the 
visual and textual fields in such a way that it (re)produces the euro-ethnoepisteme. This 
continual process of re-iteration of knowledge is always already a founding violence, 
much like Mbembe describes with commandement. In other words, I read 
epidermalization alongside the right to maim as co-extensive processes that upholds and 
conceals coloniality as a form of knowledge production. That is to say, epi stands in for 
epistemology and dermis stands in for the skin or the flesh of the body which is imbued 
with knowledge as if it were a priori, that is, it naturalizes the dominant Euro-American 
ethnoepisteme about bodies. It is a double process, in other words, of producing 
knowledge of bodies and bodies as knowledge. Further, by producing the Euro-American 
ethnoepisteme as naturalized or a priori during encounters with the other, coloniality, 
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which finds its engines within this episteme, conceals itself. The colonized or racialized, 
then, is a maligner not because of a long-enduring structure but because of sheer biology.  
 Elsewhere, Sara Mameni describes epidermalization in terms of dermopolitics, 
rooting the term within the work of Hortense J. Spiller, Sylvia Wynter, and Simone 
Browne.188 For Mameni, epidermalization describes “captive bodies,” such as in the case 
of Abu Ghraib, wherein race as a form of knowledge is imposed on the body in these 
scenes of captivity. Indeed, we have witnessed this with the example of Paul Alphonse 
who, with the very act of being injured, his “indigeneity” is imposed on him or the 
thousands of Algerians stripped naked and tortured. Indeed, it seems that the Muslim 
Algerian, for the Frenchmen, only becomes a North African Muslim once stripped, 
humiliated, and electrocuted. Nevertheless, Mameni’s dermopolitics offers an important 
insight that can already be seen in Fanon’s critique of the North African Syndrome: “[I 
use] Dermopolitics not merely as a corrective to how bodies are managed—or dealt life 
and death based on the shapes and colors of their skins—but as a feminist and queer of 
color analytic that upholds the specificity of the body as the site of political 
knowledge.”189 As such, I think through epidermalization as not only a process of 
racialization, but a process of knowledge production to hold the bodies of the other 
captive for interrogation and wounding. In this way, I take epidermalization beyond 
obvious scenes of captivity such as the interrogation centre or the prison. For Fanon, the 
white gaze imposes a prison of whiteness. As Fanon asserts in reference to Euro-
American knowledge production about his body and being, “I am a prisoner of the 
vicious circle.”190 With this in mind, I use the term “scenes of captivity” rather than 
Hartman’s “scenes of subjection” because these scenes are in fact often foreclosed from 
view. Captivity is a mode of concealing bodies while producing knowledge about those 
bodies.  
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 In the introduction to Black Skin, White Masks Fanon introduces epidermalization 
as the two-pronged process that engenders the inferiority complex in the racialized. 
Fanon writes, “The inferiority complex can be ascribed to a double process. First, 
economic. Then, internalization or rather epidermalization of this inferiority.”191 For the 
purposes of this discussion, I will leave aside the economic forces to which Fanon refers. 
Throughout Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon takes to task historical materialism, finding 
that Marxism must always be stretched when it comes to the onto-epistmological projects 
of the racialized and/or colonized subject if only because the history that Marxism 
supposes rejects those histories seemingly belonging to “primitive accumulation”—or the 
dustbins of history as Coulthard would put it. Most important for the conversation here is 
that Fanon recognizes that the inferiority complex engendered by coloniality cannot 
simply be internalization of this inferiority. Rather, it is the epidermalization of 
inferiority—the inscribing of inferiority onto the skin. This insight for Fanon emerges out 
of his unforgiving dialogue with Jean-Paul Sartre. Critiquing Sartre’s ‘Black Orpheus’ 
and dialectical supposition that Négritude (or blackness) is merely a stepping stone 
towards a transcendent universalism, Fanon writes, “Jean-Paul Sartre forgets that the 
black man suffers in his body quite differently from the white man.”192 The black body 
for Fanon is overdetermined from both the inside and the outside; the black subject 
cannot accessibly escape the captivity of these overdetermining forces of knowledge 
production.193 As such, the internalization/epidermalization of the white gaze forces a 
perpetual self-interrogation that Fanon describes earlier: who am I in reality?  
 It is at this point that I wish to point out that epidermalization describes the 
maiming of the racialized subject’s subjectivity in certain scenes of captivity, where the 
question or exclamation not only captures the body of the other, but also amputates his or 
her being. It is here where epidermalization hints at the vectors of biopower and founding 
violence within knowledge production. Indeed, the language Fanon deploys to describe 
this psycho-existential maiming is quite violent, borrowing, interestingly enough, the 
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imagery of medicine. As Fanon recounts: “The white gaze, the only valid one, is already 
dissecting me. I am fixed. Once the microtomes are sharpened, the Whites objectively cut 
sections of my reality.”194 Every question cuts. Every interrogation unmakes the world of 
the black subject, yet not always as a will to “make die” because it is a slow violence of a 
scalpel that cuts away, negates, and etches a series of nots into the subject’s being. Fanon 
continues: 
I couldn’t take it any longer, for I already knew there were legends, 
stories, history, and especially the historicity that Jaspers had taught me. 
As a result, the body scheme, attacked in several places, collapsed, giving 
way to an epidermal racial schema.195 
The scene of captivity, then, works to first found the epidermal racial schema—to unearth 
an ethnoepisteme from the flesh of the other—which then functions to debilitate, 
paralyze, and partition off the racialized subject’s capacity to live both their reality and 
their future.196 In other words, both their future and their reality is held captive within the 
question who am I in reality? The right to maim, then, can in fact wound the onto-
epistemological prospects of the colonized subject. Finally, I want to return briefly to a 
scene of captivity discussed in the conclusion of chapter one: the interrogation that begins 
Fanon’s reflection on the lived experience of the black subject. 
 The chapter begins with the founding violence of a presumably white man, 
exclaiming “Look! A negro!” It is at this moment in which the body of the subject that 
Fanon narrates is captured by the ethno-episteme. Throughout the chapter, the 
exclamation is reiterated by different voices and in different contexts—all of which 
(re)produce this ethno-episteme of the “negro” and the history, legends, and myths the 
categorization bears within it. It is in the citation, I wish to suggest, that the vector of 
biopower exerts its force across multiple surfaces of the body—the right to capture and 
maim the body and subject into a closed object amongst other objects. Fanon writes, “my 
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body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this 
white winter’s day.”197 For Fanon, the ethnoepisteme controls how he and his body move 
through the world (made up of whiteness) insofar as his body is always already 
debilitated by virtue of his the ethnoepisteme that is affixed, injected, written, or etched 
into the epidermis and its relation to the white gaze. In other words, the subject in 
question can rarely escape the scenes of captivity that engender interrogatives such as 
“who am I in reality” (internalized inferiority complex), “who are you,” and “what are 
you”? Interrogatives that sever the reality of the subject in captivity.  
 Finally, returning to the scene of the doctor and the patient, the patient is captured 
by the ethnoepisteme of the North African Syndrome. Finding no identifiable wounds on 
the body of the patient who hurts, the doctor sources the patient’s body, their skin, and 
their flesh as the wound. This moment, I argue, is the moment of the epidermalization of 
wounds—a moment which not only wounds but conceals the very act of wounding. 
Again, there persists the founding violence in diagnosing the other through “North 
African Syndrome,” an ethno/medical-episteme that fixes the subject in question as either 
a liar or lazy. Then, the vector of biopower denies their reality. The patient is not sick, the 
patient is not in pain, the patient is North African. Fanon narrates an encounter with a 
misdiagnosed patient: 
And he tells about his pain. Which becomes increasingly his own. He talks 
about it volubly. He takes hold of it in space and puts it before the doctor’s 
nose. He takes it, touches it with his ten fingers, develops it, exposes it. It 
grows as one watches it. He gathers it over the whole surface of his 
body.198 
Here, Fanon begins to uncover the pathology of coloniality and the psychosomatic and 
bodily wounds it inflicts on the colonized. Rather than assume the physical presence of 
wounds on the body—lesions, bruises, cuts, or boils—Fanon turns to an examination of 
the social situation. “Threatened in his affectivity, threatened in his membership in the 
                                                 
197 Ibid., 93.  
198 Fanon, Towards the African Revolution, 5. 
76 
 
community,” Fanon observes, “the North African combines all the conditions that make a 
sick man.”199 In other words, the pathology of coloniality is diagnosed as the continued 
commitment of the settler colonizer’s ability to segregate, hold captive, and alienate the 
bodies it colonizes. This ongoing hurt finds its origin in the slow violence of coloniality, 
in the thousands of psychosomatic wounds it inflicts daily.   
3.7 Conclusion: The American Dream of In/Definite 
Detention  
Throughout this chapter I have emphasized two observations that are relevant for 
thinking through contemporary crises, particularly related to the so-called “crisis” at the 
American borders. Indeed, Euro-American countries and their conservative pundits have 
geographically misplaced the crisis as one that has erupted at the borders of these nations. 
In other words, they have effectively appropriated the “crisis” from its origins, as if it 
were a festering wound, to explain its own social and economic hurt and dissatisfaction. 
In effect, this misplacing of the crisis erases the settler colonial history of population 
displacement, extraction of wealth, and the continued erosion of social welfare in non-
Euro-American nations through a variety of NGOs and humanitarian aids that come with 
a plethora of strings attached. These are a horde of processes that have engendered the 
contemporary migration crisis. Euro-American nations argue, nevertheless, that they 
must close their borders because they are vulnerable to both terrorist infiltration (recall 
Mellamphy’s notion of larval terror from Chapter One) as well as im/migrant bodies 
stealing and consuming the “prosperity” of the predominantly white body politic. At the 
same time, Euro-American conservatives and right wingers suggest that the benevolence 
of their nation has been taken advantage of by the world at large. Another crisis might be, 
however, the solution to the crisis that has been exacerbated since President Trump’s 
administration has taken over the United States’ White House; that is the normalization 
of detaining im/migrant bodies.  
 The first observation, which is that settler colonialism is a structure and not an 
event, readily describes the building of mass detainment camps in America. Under 
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Trump’s toxic influence, the United States’ government has committed punitive and 
juridical resources to containing what they call “illegal” aliens or migrants. As an influx 
of persons and families traverse American borderlines, due to violence, prosecution, 
climate change, and civil war, the United States has responded with mass incarceration. 
And in many instances, this incarceration is for profit.200 These camps, as well as 
abandoned Wal-Marts that have been remodeled to contain human beings in cages, 
belong to the structure of settler colonialism.201 As such, these detainment centres, 
whatever insidious form they take, are not new. Instead, we can regard them as 
permutations of the settler colonial structure.  
 More importantly, these centres of detainment, which I have called “scenes of 
captivity,” foreclose from immediate view the vectors of biopower and (founding) 
violence that are enacted across the bodily surface of detainees. Hence, the value of 
reading Algeria’s war for independence against the French as a formative example of the 
lengths settler colonialism will go to protect and retain its right to maim, rule, and 
occupy. In the last decade and a half, more and more accounts of France’s interrogation 
centres have been published. This includes what I have examined in this chapter in 
addition to Paul Aussaresses The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 
and the translations of Assia Djebar’s oeuvre into English. Yet, I do not find this to be a 
coincidence. It is no secret that the United States military has also utilized the example of 
the battle for Algiers as a “counter-terrorism” method.202 Nevertheless, since the 
detention of so many im/migrant bodies within the United States, reports of physical 
assault—sexual and otherwise—has surfaced as a normal and legitimated aspect of 
im/migrant mass incarceration.203  
 This brings me to my second observation: epidermalization. In this case, 
epidermalization describes the process of marking and naturalizing certain bodies as 
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im/migrant or illegal. Currently a surplus of knowledge accumulates, perhaps at an 
unprecedented rate, about im/migrant, black, Indigenous, and brown bodies as always 
already a terrorist, a threat, and illegal. Indeed, this knowledge, which is rendered on the 
surface of racialized and Indigenous bodies as if it were a priori, has justified the false 
detainment, abuse, and police shootings of racialized and Indigenous bodies.  
 Finally, I believe that it is important in this ongoing dialogue on police brutality 
as well as mass incarceration of black, Indigenous, and brown bodies—that is not to 
exclude queer bodies—to put critical pressure on how knowledge about these bodies is 
produced within these scenes of captivity. Indeed, one of the most frightening aspects 
about Abu Ghraib is the fact that the archive his hidden. Or that the clarity of Paul 
Alphonse’s wounding and eventual death is mired in bureaucracy, opposing testimony, 
and the court system. Not only must we attest to the ways in which violence by settler 
colonial state apparati and actors is inscribed across the surface of racialized bodies, but 
we must also attend to the ways in which knowledge-production of these events attempts 
to erase any trace of its occurrence.  
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4 Conclusion - The Contingencies of Healing  
Violence, like Achilles’ spear, can heal the wounds it’s inflicted. 
-Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface to the Wretched of the Earth 
In writing this thesis, I have sought to think through how wounds enter politics. While 
my research focused on two disparate geographical-temporal contexts—French Algeria 
and post-9/11 United States—I have shed light on the historical and discursive 
continuities shared between these two contexts. Indeed, both sovereignties persist as 
settler colonies, at least in some form or at some time with respect to France, that have 
utilized knowledge production and extrajudicial measures to detain and maim both 
unassimilable Indigenous others and undesirable exogenous others. On the one hand, 
these ventures are framed as the necessary measures to protect, guard, and toughen a 
nation’s borders. On the other hand, they are framed as a civilizing or humanitarian 
mission. Regardless, in both instances these others are hurt, injured, and wounded as well 
as produced as inherently vulnerable subjects to the whims and wills of paranoid empires 
that mask this production—either through the discursive practices of humanitarianism or 
by centering themselves as the wounded subject.  
 Chapter One uncovered a pernicious contradiction in the discourse of settler 
colonial nations such as the United States and Canada. That is, these settler colonial 
nations speak in terms of their wounded body politic while simultaneously projecting 
their body politic as hard, stoic, and, at times, invulnerable. Upon further investigation, it 
is apparent that whiteness embodies this contradiction both in its politics as well as its 
textual and visual representations. As such, I contend that, most strikingly within the 
context after 9/11, whiteness has crafted a wounded or woundable identity, shaping its 
embodiment and as well as crafting its futures as anticipatory, fearful, apocalyptic, and 
full of future hurt. In short, whiteness commonly narrates itself as always already under 
attack, wounded by terrorists, and amidst a white genocide.  
 In Chapter Two, my argument is twofold. Firstly, I posit that French Algeria is a 
present-past mode of settler colonialism. To be sure, France no longer occupies Algeria 
formally through the material structures that a typical settler colonial society might. 
However, the legacy of French Algeria continues to animate conversations and struggles 
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between France and Algeria. For example, France actively subdues its history as a settler 
colonial sovereignty in addition to a continued withholding of an archive of memory, 
data, and truth from Algerians. Secondly, I argue that French Algeria depended on—
particularly at the close of its tenure—the biopolitical logics of captivity such as the 
interrogation centre. Within these spaces, the French colonizer produced an 
ethnoepisteme, which I have described as a product of epidermalization, about the 
unassimilable Indigenous others. This ethnoepisteme rendered the Muslim, Arab, and 
other Indigenous persons as wounded, broken, and humiliated while at the same time 
wounding, breaking, and humiliating their body and spirit. It is important to understand 
that both the act of torture and the act of knowledge production share a space within these 
scenes of captivity.  
 While I predominantly focus on settler colonial contexts throughout this thesis, 
my analysis is not limited to these modes of critique. We live in a political moment where 
far-right populism, proto-fascism, and white supremacy fetishizes victimhood. These 
politically charged groups are finding strategies to raise the volume of their voice as if 
they have been silenced. To be sure, the intent of my thesis has not been to judge or 
render the politics of wounds as necessarily negative or unproductive. Indeed, critical 
race, Indigenous, feminist, and queer scholarship often go to great lengths to show that 
pain and suffering can be productive. It is from this perspective that I hold some caution 
with regards to Brown’s pessimistic reading of how wounds are deployed in political 
discourses. However, the politics of wounds within white supremacy and patriarchy has 
become increasingly and disturbingly volatile. The perceived hurt of Incel members, 
KKK members, or Sons of Odin members, for example, has engendered real hurt in the 
form of mass shootings and grotesque hate crimes. Of course, these reactions share the 
same logic that justifies drone strikes across the Middle East as restorative of or restoring 
the natural order of things. Yet, democratic crusades in the name of peace and freedom 
have yet to prove they are productive. I want to begin thinking through how certain 
politics of wounds can in fact engender a productive praxis of healing.  
 What other capacities are a part of pain and hurt outside of the hegemonic 
discursive assemblages discussed throughout this thesis? I would like the final words of 
this thesis, then, to gesture towards a politics of healing that has been vital to a number of 
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Indigenous and postcolonial thinkers, activists, and writers. The conversation becomes 
risky when it centres on wounded subjectivities without also thinking through how 
wounds, in fact, generate modes of healing such as refusal, resistance, and resilience. In 
other words, wounds need not always be interpreted as negative. Hurt, pain, and injury 
can be a powerful force for forming new collectives, practices, and expression. As Evans 
notes, and which many postcolonial and Indigenous thinkers identify in their own 
contexts, many Indigenous Algerians turned towards their own poetry, metaphors, and 
music to subvert settler colonial knowledge production as well as to generate their own 
knowledge: “They sang of pain. They sang of suffering. They sang of exclusion. Shared 
emotions that pointed to the way in which popular music and theatre […] became a 
measure of Muslim anger.”204 I take this anger, however, not to mean what Brown and 
Ahmed have described in terms of negative ressentement. Rather, these collectives that 
hinge upon active refusals of settler colonialisms nurture a resilient fecundity that 
engender optimistic futures.  
 Yet, as Ahmed points out, “the question of who is doing healing and who is being 
healed is a troubling one.”205 Indeed, as I pointed out in Chapter One, settler colonial 
discourses, in an attempt to mask their coloniality, adopt the wounds and injuries of their 
subjects, healing on their behalf. As such, healing as a practice begins as a refusal of the 
discursive and material structures. Refusal, to be sure, can take many different forms. For 
Fanon, refusal was embedded within a material violence that literally worked to tear 
down the colonial system. “Deep down the colonized subject acknowledges no 
authority,” Fanon writes, “He is dominated but not domesticated […] He patiently waits 
for the colonist to let his guard down and then jumps on him.”206 Fanon’s interlocutor, 
Sartre, regarded this material violence as mode of healing. Fanon’s violence, however, is 
not compatible with every context. Coulthard, an Indigenous scholar who draws from 
Fanon’s politics, thinks through healing in terms of active refusal, yet a refusal which is 
embedded within an Indigenous anger that affirms fecund futures. As Coulthard writes, 
“the emergence of reactive emotions like anger and resentment can indicate a breakdown 
                                                 
204 Evans, Algeria Undeclared, 41.  
205 Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotions, 35.  
206 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 16.  
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of colonial subjection and thus open up a possibility of developing alternative 
subjectivities and anticolonial practices.”207 Crucial to both thinkers, who share similar 
settler colonial circumstances, is a concern with who is being healed and who is doing the 
healing, if only because certain modes of healing work to regenerate and conceal the very 
practice of maiming or wounding that this healing is contingent upon.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
207 Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 115.  
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